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Probation is the most commonly imposed criminal sentence in the United
States, with nearly four million adults currently under supervision. Yet the law
of probation has not been the focus of sustained research or analysis. This
Article examines the standard conditions of probation in the sixteen jurisdic-
tions that use probation most expansively. A detailed analysis of these condi-
tions is important, because the extent of the state's authority to control and
punish probationers depends on the substance of the conditions imposed.
Based on the results of my analysis, I argue that the standard conditions of
probation, which make a wide variety of noncriminal conduct punishable with
criminal sanctions, construct a definition of recidivism that contributes to
overcriminalization. At the same time, probationary systems concentrate adjudi-
cative and legislative power in probation officers, often to the detriment of the
socially disadvantaged. Although probation is frequently invoked as a potential
solution to the problem of overincarceration, I argue that it instead should be
analyzed as part of the continuum of excessive penal control.
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INTRODUCTION
Probation plays a dominant role in the operation of the U.S. criminal justice
system. Approximately four million adults in the United States are now on
probation,1 a court-ordered sentence that provides for a period of community
supervision as a penalty for a crime. In sentencing a person to probation, a court
imposes a battery of conditions intended to regulate that person's behavior
during the period of supervision. Probation officers supervise probationers for
compliance with the conditions imposed.
Probation should not be confused with parole, which involves community
supervision as a function of an inmate's early release from prison. Unlike
parole, probation is an independent criminal sentence imposed and administered
by a judge.2 The judge, assisted by the probation officer, retains jurisdiction
during the period of the sentence.
The law of probation has not received attention commensurate with its
enormous role in the criminal justice system. Mass incarceration casts a long
shadow, deflecting focus away from probation and toward the more "serious"
1. LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2013, at 2, tbl.1 (2014) (noting that 3,910,600 people were on probation at year-end
2013).
2. See, e.g., 1 NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 1:1 (2d ed. 1999) (observing that
probation is "a sanction imposed by a court as punishment for a criminal offense," whereas parole is an
"administrative rather than a judicial procedure").
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condition of imprisonment.3 This state of affairs is exemplified by the accompa-
nying graph, which is excerpted from a 2014 National Research Council (NRC)
report on the growth of incarceration in the United States.4 The graph, which
appears in a chapter titled "Rising Incarceration Rates" in the NRC report,
reveals the extent to which increases in the U.S. probation population have
dwarfed increases in the prison and parole populations.5 At year-end 2013, there
were approximately 2.2 million inmates in U.S. prisons and jails.6 This figure,
although breathtaking in its scope, is still only roughly half the number of U.S.
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My long-term project is to reframe the debate and to enlarge its focus so that
we examine systems of penal control holistically, with the understanding that
incarceration is just one part of a continuum of punishments. When considered
from the perspective of overall penal control, mass incarceration represents only
the tip of the iceberg: a huge percentage of the population has been swept up in
the criminal justice system through mechanisms other than prisons or jails. The
phenomenon of hypersupervision outside of prisons must be scrutinized
accordingly.
This Article is part of that larger project. In an earlier piece, I analyzed
federal supervised release, a form of postincarceration supervision that has
3. See, e.g., Michelle S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of
Mass Incarceration, 35 LAW & PoL'Y 51, 52 (2013) ("As mass incarceration boomed, scholars largely
lost interest in probation,... rarely engaging with it seriously as an important institution.").
4. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 41 figs.2-4 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014).
5. d.
6. GLAZE & KAEBLE, supra note 1.
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become nearly universal in the federal system.7 I now take a broader look at
probation systems, state and federal, around the country. These systems wield
an almost farcical level of control over people's lives but, as I previously
discovered with respect to supervised release, diverge radically from the concep-
tual and jurisprudential underpinnings that are invoked to justify them. Ulti-
mately, I hope to explore how all of these systems of community supervision
and control-supervised release, probation, and parole-can be reformed to
make them coherent, transparent, and aligned with societal values and goals.
The task is vital because the pressure to expand probation continues to build.
Despite the huge number of people already on probation, it is often invoked as
an attractive solution for addressing the problem of mass incarceration.8 Groups
as varied as Right on Crime and the ACLU have been pushing for more
probation.9
It is not clear that probation's advocates fully appreciate the substantive
impact of the system, however. Courts, legislators, and scholars have devoted
almost no attention to analyzing (or even acknowledging) the conditions of
probation that are routinely imposed on probationers in state after state, year
after year.10 These conditions articulate the standards and obligations that
determine what it means to be on probation, but they are not even publicly
accessible in most places.
This Article aims to address that problem by doing three things. First, it
draws on original research to expose this hidden body of law and presents a
wide-ranging study of the most common conditions of probation in the jurisdic-
tions that use probation most heavily. By excavating the language of these
conditions, I reveal how the law (a) sets standards for the conduct and character
of people on probation, and (b) creates an enforcement structure to monitor and
penalize probationers for behavior that falls short of those standards.
Mapping out the legal contours of probation creates the data necessary to
achieve the second objective of this Article. Once the conditions of probation
have been made visible, it becomes possible to cross-check the prevailing
theoretical justifications for probation against the system as it actually exists. I
therefore analyze the substance of the conditions, along with the process by
which those conditions are enforced, against the backdrop of the theories that
7. Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88
N.Y.U. L. REv. 958 (2013). Among other things, I unearthed the history of supervised release and
argued that reforms that were intended to implement a determinate federal sentencing system instead
resulted in the implementation of an indeterminate sentencing regime.
8. See, e.g., Phelps, supra note 3, at 51 ("One of the most popular reform suggestions is to expand
probation supervision in lieu of incarceration.").
9. See AM. C.L. UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS
WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 11 (2011) (advocating probation as alternative to incarceration for
low-level drug offenders); Priority Issues: Adult Probation, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.
com/category/priority-issues/adult-probation/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2015) (same).
10. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 7:1 (discussing how "surprisingly little judicial or legislative
attention has been devoted to analyzing" the purposes behind probation conditions).
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courts have relied on to justify the legal structure of probation. I have identified
three such theories of probation, which I call the benevolent supervisor theory,
the privilege theory, and the contract theory.
The third goal of this Article is to help promote a conversation about the law
of probation similar to the discourse that has developed around other once-
neglected but crucial dimensions of the criminal justice system. I argue that,
like plea bargaining, probation is a shadow system of law enforcement and
adjudication that actually drives how the criminal justice system operates in
practice.
To isolate the core legal framework of probation, this Article focuses on the
standard conditions of probation: the conditions that set the baseline require-
ments for every person who receives probation within a given system. Standard
conditions are the conditions that judges and probation departments impose
automatically upon probationers in their jurisdictions.
As measured by standard conditions, probation systems have broad and at
times surprising expectations for those under their control: probationers must be good
people, in addition to being law-abiding people. Avoiding new criminal activity is just
one component of the conditions imposed. In many jurisdictions, probationers must
also obey all variety of civil laws (federal, state, or local) as a standard condition of
their probation. And moving beyond the requirements of law, probation systems also
include conditions that instruct probationers to conduct themselves properly or to
remain on good behavior. Other typical conditions include:
* Avoid injurious and vicious habits;
* Avoid persons and places of disreputable or harmful character;
* Work diligently at a lawful occupation as directed by your probation
officer;
* Support your dependents to the best of your ability, as directed by your
probation officer.
Thus, the state seeks to regulate many aspects of a probationer's behavior-
far beyond what is covered by the criminal law-as a consequence of being on
probation.
Because standard conditions reach beyond the criminal law, they necessarily
also broaden the behavior that constitutes recidivism. Any violation of a proba-
tion condition is an act of recidivism that can result in a custodial sentence,
whether the violation is substantive (a new crime) or technical (any other
behavior that violates a condition of probation).11 To avoid the threat of
11. See, e.g., NANCY LAVIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATE ASSESSMENT
REPORT 8 (2014) (noting definition of recidivism for probationers as "a new crime or a technical
violation of supervision"); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (West 2015), amended by 2015 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 61 (S.B. 517) (West) (providing that probationers can be arrested and sentenced for
violating any term or condition of their supervision, but giving courts power to order their release);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, §§ 21(b), 23(a) (West 2015) (to be recodified as TEX. CODE
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incarceration, a probationer must follow all of the conditions of probation, and
not just be deterred from committing a new criminal act.
The use of vague and moralistic standards in the conditions of probation
raises important questions. Whose morals provide the yardstick by which
recidivism is judged? What does it mean to be on good behavior? Who decides
when the friend or family member of a probationer is a disreputable influence?
When is someone trying hard enough to find work while on probation? What
are the class and race implications of setting these kinds of requirements, given
that probationers are mostly poor
12 and are disproportionately racial minorities?
1 3
These questions become all the more important when considered in conjunc-
tion with the strong policing powers that probation officers have to enforce
compliance with the conditions of probation. Probation officers can conduct
unannounced visits to a probationer's home or work, for example, and can carry
out warrantless searches of a probationer's person, home, or other personal
property. They can force probationers to respond to detailed questions and
require them to be truthful in how they respond. And they can sanction
probationers administratively for violating any condition of probation. These
administrative sanctions, which are imposed in a nonpublic setting, typically
range from increased reporting requirements to confinement in a probation
detention center. As part of a new deterrence-oriented philosophy, probation
departments are increasingly instructing their officers to respond to each and
every violation of a condition of probation.
Having laid bare the core legal structure of probation, I argue that none of the
three theories that courts have traditionally used to justify the law of probation
fits the system that has come to exist.
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A, §§ 751(b), 755(a) (West 2017)) (authorizing judges to order the arrest of a
defendant for a "violation of any of the conditions" of community supervision and to impose a
custodial sentence upon revocation); St. of Ga., Final Disposition Felony Sentence with Probation,
SC-6.2 [hereinafter Ga., SC-6.2] ("The Defendant is subject to arrest for any violation of probation. If
probation is revoked, the Court may order incarceration."); St. of Ga., Final Disposition Misdemeanor
Sentence, SC-6.3 [hereinafter Ga., SC-6.3] (same); Adult Prob. Dep't, Allen Cnty., Ind., Order of
Probation ("I understand that a failure to obey any condition of probation means that I can be sent to
prison."); Prob. Dep't, Ct. of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, Rules of Probation and Commu-
nity Control ("[F]ailing to comply with one or more conditions may result in my arrest, a violation
hearing, and imposition of jail or prison sentence."); Adult Prob. & Parole Dep't, Montgomery Cnty.,
Pa., Probation/Parole and Intermediate Punishment Rights, Waiver, and Acknowledgment ("If the Court
decides that I have violated one or more conditions of my probation... I may be committed to prison
for such time as may be specified by the Court .... ); Adult Prob. & Parole, R.I. Dep't of Corr.,
Conditions of Supervised Probation ("Failure to follow each and every one of the Conditions of
Probation could result in further Court action. If I violate my Probation, the Court could impose the
sentence allowable by law.").
12. Approximately 80%-90% of criminal defendants are poor enough to qualify for court-appointed
counsel. ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY
4 (2010).
13. In 2013, for example, approximately 30% of adult probationers were black. ERINN J. HERBERMAN
& THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 17,
app. tbl.3 (2014).
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The Benevolent Supervisor Theory. Many of the current conditions of proba-
tion are relics of an era in which the probation officer was meant to be an
enlightened and benevolent figure: a person who could humanely elevate mem-
bers of the disadvantaged classes. But if courts once counted on the benevolent
intentions of probation officers, however paternalistic that framework might
have been, modern day probation systems focus heavily on enforcement and
deterrence, not on a mission of benevolence. The public (or rather, public
safety) has displaced the probationer as the true client of probation systems.
The Privilege Theory. Although probation was once considered a special act
of grace, it is now often the default sentence, rather than a discounted sentence.
And courts are increasingly using probation as a method of supplementing
incarceration, rather than as a method of avoiding incarceration altogether.
The Contract Theory. This theory rests heavily on the validity of the privilege
theory: a person agrees to be bound by the requirements of probation in return
for the privilege of being on probation. To the extent that probation can be
conceptualized as a contract, however, it is a contract of adhesion, rather than a
negotiated contract. And the only way to opt out of the contract is to insist on
incarceration, even if no one else would be incarcerated for the same crime.
Many of the questions raised by exposing the legal structure of probation
share common ground with scholarship on other important aspects of the
criminal justice system. I argue that probation systems constitute particularly
strong (but neglected) examples of practices-such as overcriminalization, the
shifting of power toward the system's law enforcers, and the unequal treatment
of the poor-that have been criticized and reevaluated in other parts of the
criminal justice system. In particular, I argue that the role and power of the
probation officer deserves as much scrutiny as scholars have given to the role
and power of the prosecutor.
Through this Article, I hope to prompt a reexamination of two important
aspects of the law of probation: (1) a broad and undertheorized definition of
recidivism that lays tripwires for the poor and disadvantaged; and (2) the huge
grant of discretionary power made to probation officers to enforce the antirecidi-
vism agenda.
This Article has five Parts. Part I sets forth my methodology, explaining how
I chose the jurisdictions studied. Part II examines the standard conditions of
probation in these jurisdictions to tease out he baseline definition of recidivism.
Part III analyzes the enforcement structure of probation, including the policing
powers granted to probation officers through the standard conditions of proba-
tion. Part IV examines the three theories that courts have used to justify the
state's powers over probationers. Part V analyzes how the law of probation
exemplifies and perpetuates key problems that legal scholars have identified
elsewhere in the criminal justice system.
I. METHODOLOGY
To study the legal framework of probation, I needed to gather together the
standard conditions that courts and probation departments impose on probation-
2016]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
ers. To do so, I had to find out what conditions courts were including on their
preprinted judgment forms. And if these judicial forms did not list the standard
conditions of probation, I had to get the supervision forms that probation
departments provide to their probationers. Many probation departments create a
basic instructions form, distributed to their own probationers, which lists the
standard conditions of probation for that jurisdiction.
Although applied routinely, the standard conditions of probation are not
easily accessible. Very few jurisdictions make the forms available on their
websites. For most jurisdictions, retrieving these documents requires a huge
investment of time. The first step is determining which form is used. The next
step is finding out who can provide a copy of the form. Then, that clerk or
probation officer has to be persuaded to provide a copy of the form. In many
probation departments, the head of the office has to approve the request. As a
result, retrieving the forms is time-consuming even if a clerk's office or
probation department is trying to be helpful.
To make matters more complicated, many probationers are supervised through
county-based probation departments, rather than state-based probation depart-
ments. State-administered systems have a single, unified structure. They t pi-
cally use the same set of standard conditions throughout the state. In county-
based systems, however, each county has its own probation department and its
own set (or sets) of standard conditions. Studying standard conditions in these
states requires obtaining forms from multiple counties.
The resulting complexity explains, in significant part, why so little is known
about the actual conditions that are imposed on probationers.14 As Joan Peter-
silia has noted, "[p]robation receives little public scrutiny, not by intent but
because the probation system is so complex and the data are scattered among
hundreds of loosely connected agencies, each operating with a wide variety of
rules and structures." 15 But without a detailed grasp of the conditions imposed,
it is not possible to understand the kinds of power that probation systems are
authorized to exercise.
To uncover precisely these details, this Article examines the standard condi-
tions of probation in the U.S. jurisdictions that use probation most heavily. To
do so, I study the probation conditions imposed in two different categories of
states. The first category, captured in Figure 1, consists of the ten states that
currently have the greatest number of adults under probation supervision:
Georgia, Texas, California, Ohio, Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois,
Indiana, and New Jersey.16 Together, these ten states have 2,401,478 adults on
14. The Robina Institute at the University of Minnesota has reported on some discretionary
conditions of probation suggested by state statute, but its report does not document the actual
conditions imposed via court forms. See ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., PROFILES IN PROBATION
REVOCATION: EXAMINING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN 21 STATES (2014).
15. Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 153 (1997).
16. HERBERMAN & BONCZAR, supra note 13, at 16, app. tbl.2.
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probation, more than half of the country's total probation population.17 The
second category, captured in Figure 2, consists of the ten states that currently
have the highest percentage of their adult residents on probation: Georgia, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Idaho, Minnesota, Indiana, Michigan, Delaware, Texas, and
Hawaii.18 Georgia, which leads both categories, has one in 14.6 adults on
probation.19
Figure 1
Ten States with the Most People on Probation










Ten States with the Greatest Percentage of Adults on Probation
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Four other states fall into both of the categories in my study: Texas, Ohio,
Michigan, and Indiana. Accordingly, the study includes the standard conditions
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (noting that Georgia has 6,829 on probation for every 100,000 adult residents).
2016]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
used in a total of fifteen states. These fifteen states are roughly split between
state-based probation systems and county-based systems.20 Because county-
based systems are so diffuse, I focus on the standard probation conditions
imposed in the three largest counties in each of the county-based states.
In addition to the fifteen states in Figures 1 and 2, I also look at the standard
conditions of probation imposed in the federal system. I do this for two reasons.
First, the federal conditions have a wide geographic reach.21 Second, the federal
system has significantly undercounted the number of people it has on proba-
tion.22 When the figures are properly tabulated, the federal system is among the
heaviest users of probation.
The statistical anomaly derives from the federal definition of probation. In the
federal system, the term probation is used narrowly in its traditional sense: it
describes community supervision imposed as a pure alternative to incarceration,
rather than a supplement to incarceration. Unlike in most state systems, federal
judges cannot sentence defendants to a term of incarceration followed by a term
of probation. As defined by the federal system, it is one or the other: probation
or incarceration.
But the federal system does have a program of what is in effect postincarcera-
tion probation. In the federal system, postrelease supervision is called super-
vised release, rather than probation. I have described elsewhere how supervised
release has evolved over the last twenty-five years to embrace the powers
claimed by probation systems.23 Federal judges use supervised release to im-
pose exactly the same kinds of split sentences routinely imposed in state
systems. Supervised release is simply the form of probation used to supplement
incarceration in the federal system.
When supervised release is counted as a kind of probation, the federal
supervision figures become substantial. With 130,214 people under supervi-
sion,24 the federal system falls between Pennsylvania and Illinois on Figure 1. I
am therefore including federal probation and supervised release in my study.
II. CONDITIONS AS THE MEASURE OF RECIDIVISM
The conditions of probation provide a detailed record of the legal parameters
of recidivism. Probationers are expected to adhere to the conditions to demon-
strate their rehabilitation and avoid the threat of having their probation revoked.
Although this Article focuses on standard conditions, I should note that
separating out standard conditions provides only a narrow window into the
20. The states with largely county-based systems include Texas, California, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, Indiana, and Minnesota.
21. AO-245B (Rev. 9/11) Judgment in a Criminal Case.
22. See HERBERMAN & BONCZAR, supra note 13, at 18, app. tbl.4 (counting supervised release as a
form of parole, rather than probation).
23. Doherty, supra note 7, at 1012-13.
24. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S CTS., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2014 app. tbl.E-2 (2014).
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content of recidivism. Judges often impose special conditions of probation,
tailored to the individual circumstances of a defendant. Because judges can
impose an endless variety of special conditions, a detailed study of special
conditions is beyond the scope of this Article.
Instead, I focus on the categories of standard conditions that I find most
problematic. These include proscriptions to obey all laws, be good and associate
with good people, work and support one's family, and pay a host of fees to the
probation department and the court.
At this stage, I am concerned primarily with highlighting the power structures
that the law creates by adopting these requirements as conditions of probation. I
also begin to examine how such conditions operate in practice, but much more
research needs to be done in this regard. Understanding how the law of
probation functions on the ground is particularly challenging given the multiplic-
ity of jurisdictions, the rarity of documented probation decisions in written
opinions,25 and a general lack of public oversight over the daily work of
probation officers. As I will emphasize, however, broad conditions, combined
with supercharged enforcement powers, create an almost unlimited amount of
power for these officers.
A. COMMIT NO CRIME/OBEY ALL LAWS
In theory, avoiding recidivism could require only that a person who is
convicted of a crime not commit any new crime. But this vision-living a life
free from crime-is only the beginning of how most jurisdictions define the
obligations of being on probation.
Every jurisdiction in my study includes a condition that instructs probationers
not to violate the criminal law. As indicated on Table 1, several jurisdictions
(including Georgia and Michigan) specifically instruct probationers not to
violate a criminal law of any unit of government.26 Although phrased broadly to
capture all variety of criminal acts, this condition is confined to the limits of the
criminal law.
Marion County, Indiana, arguably has the most expansive form of a com-
mit-no crime condition. In Marion County, a probationer shall "not be charged
with any new criminal offense based on probable cause."27 This condition is
pointedly phrased to make probationers vulnerable to revocation because of a
new prosecution, whether the prosecution proves successful or not.
25. See, e.g., Interview with Pub. Defender, DeKalb Cnty., Ga. (Sept. 30, 2014) (on file with author)
(noting that she had never seen a judge write out an opinion on a violation of probation); Interview with
Pub. Defender, L.A. Cnty., Cal. (Dec. 18, 2014) (on file with author) (observing that judges rule from
the bench and o not write decisions in probation proceedings).
26. See Ga., SC-6.2, supra note 11; Ga., SC-6.3, supra note 11; Judicial Cir. Ct., State of Mich.,
Order of Probation, CC 243(a); Judicial Cir. Ct., State of Mich., Order of Probation (Misdemeanor),
DCC 243.
27. Superior Ct., Marion Cnty., Ind., Order of Probation.
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Most jurisdictions go beyond criminal violations, forbidding any violation of
the criminal or civil law within the same condition of probation. Some, such as
the three largest counties in Texas, mandate that a probationer obey all state and
federal laws-with no distinction between the civil and the criminal.28 Others,
such as counties in Ohio and Pennsylvania, specify that a probationer violate no
local, state, or federal law.29 A last group of jurisdictions, including Rhode
Island and Los Angeles County, California, uses language that is even more
general. In these jurisdictions, probationers must simply "obey all laws" as a
condition of their probation.30
My study reveals that the most standard-of-standard conditions-that a proba-
tioner not commit a new crime-is often encapsulated in language that demol-
ishes any distinction between the civil and criminal law. By failing to set apart
civil from criminal wrongdoing, these jurisdictions bring the entire remit of
civil law within the legal definition of recidivism. The most extreme version of
this condition is represented by the standard condition used in Lake County,
Illinois. In Lake County, probationers must obey all laws or ordinances (civil or
criminal) of any jurisdiction, specifically defined to include traffic regulations.
31
In this context, speeding or bad parking become acts of recidivism.
32
This wholesale incorporation of the civil into the criminal law is an indicator
of the lack of rigor that has accompanied the development of probation.
28. Dallas Cnty., Tex., Conditions of Community Supervision [hereinafter Dallas Cnty., Tex.,
Community Supervision]; Dallas Cnty., Tex., Condition of Supervision, Unsupervised Misdemeanor
Probation [hereinafter Dallas Cnty., Tex., Misdemeanor Probation]; Harris Cnty., Tex., Conditions of
Community Supervision; Tarrant Cnty., Tex., Conditions of Community Supervision [hereinafter
Tarrant Cnty., Tex., Community Supervision] (order used for felony probation); Tarrant Cnty., Tex.,
Deferred Adjudication Order [hereinafter Tarrant Cnty., Tex., Deferred Adjudication] (order used for
misdemeanor probation).
29. Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, supra note 11; Adult Prob. Dep't, Ct. of Common Pleas, Franklin Cnty.,
Ohio, Conditions of Supervision; Adult Prob. Dep't, 5th Judicial Dist., Allegheny Cnty., Pa., General
Rules and Conditions of Probation, Parole and Intermediate Punishment; Adult Prob. & Parole Dep't,
Montgomery Cnty., Pa., Rules and Conditions Governing Probation/Parole and Intermediate Punish-
ment; Adult Prob. & Parole Dep't, 1st Judicial Dist., Phila. Cnty., Pa., Rules of Probation and Parole.
30. Superior Ct., L.A. Cnty., Cal., Felony Sentencing Memorandum [hereinafter L.A. Cnty., Cal.,
Felony]; Superior Ct., L.A. Cnty., Cal., Misdemeanor Sentencing Memorandum-General Misdemeanors
[hereinafter L.A. Cnty., Cal., Misdemeanor]; Superior Ct., L.A. Cnty, Cal., Misdemeanor Sentencing
Memorandum-Vehicle Code [hereinafter L.A. Cnty., Cal., Vehicle]; R.I. Dep't of Corr., supra note 11.
31. Cir. Ct. of the 19th Judicial Cir., Lake Cnty., Ill., Order and Certificate of Felony Probation
[hereinafter Lake Cnty., Ill., Felony]; Cir. Ct. of the 19th Judicial Cir., Lake Cnty., Ill., Order and
Certificate of Misdemeanor Probation/Supervised Supervision [hereinafter Lake Cnty., Ill., Misdemeanor].
32. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 408 F.3d 852, 853 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting eight month
revocation sentence based on a series of violations that included "receipt of traffic citations"); People v.
Ward, No. B233006, 2012 WL 3332367, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2012) (recounting that the trial
judge had emphasized that revocation did not depend on the seriousness of the violation because if the
defendant "got a speeding ticket, theoretically he'd be in violation"); State v. Rutledge, No. E2006-00954-
CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 924124, *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2007) (upholding eight year
revocation sentence for violations that included a speeding citation); see also Johnson v. United States,
179 F. App'x 246 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding forty-eight month revocation sentence for two violations
of supervised release: failure to timely report a speeding citation and failure to follow the rules of a
halfway house).
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Jurisdictions that do not differentiate between criminal and civil law in their
standard conditions have radically expanded the scope of potential technical
violations with just a few chosen words. Indeed, a violation based on a civil
infraction is the very essence of a technical violation: a violation that is not
itself criminal. By swallowing the civil law wholesale, an "obey the law"
condition provides countless new grounds for probationers to violate the terms
of their probation. And these are all violations that the courts-and perhaps
more importantly, probation officers-have the power to sanction.
B. "BE GOOD" AND ASSOCIATE WITH "GOOD" PEOPLE
Many jurisdictions also include what I call a "be good" condition among their
standard conditions of probation.33 As shown in Table 2, a form of this
condition appears in all three states with the largest numbers of people on
probation: Georgia, Texas, and California. It also appears in the three states with
the greatest percentage of their adults on probation: Georgia, Ohio, and Rhode
Island.
This condition takes different forms in different states. Georgia's statewide
disposition documents, for example, instruct felony and misdemeanor probation-
ers to "be of general good behavior" and "[a]void injurious and vicious habits"
as "[g]eneral [c]onditions of [p]robation."34 In California, a state statute allows
for revocation if a probationer has "become abandoned" to a "vicious life."35 In
Rhode Island, the courts characterize "[k]eeping the peace and remaining on
good behavior" as the two key conditions of probation.36
These kinds of be good conditions are so broad that they defy basic due
process requirements. In 1972, the Supreme Court held that "an enactment is
void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.,37 A law must
"give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited.,38 Instructions to be good or to conduct oneself properly are so
inherently subjective that they do not and cannot have a defined or unified
meaning.
Modern challenges to these kinds of conditions are surprisingly rare, how-
ever, despite the strong basis for objection and the signaling function the
conditions perform for defendants about the power relationships inherent in
33. See, e.g., Allen Cnty., Ind., supra note 11 ("You shall behave well .... "); Superior Ct., Lake
Cnty., Ind., Formal Probation Conditions ("I shall conduct myself as a good citizen.").
34. Ga., SC-6.2, supra note 11; Ga,. SC-6.3, supra note 11.
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (West 2015), amended on other grounds by 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv.
ch. 61 (S.B. 517) (West).
36. State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 499 (R.I. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Gromkie-
wicz, 43 A.3d 45, 48 (R.I. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
38. Id.
2016]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Table 1: "Obey the Law" Conditions
Standard "Obey the Law" Condition Jurisdiction
Do not commit another federal, state, or Federal
local crime
Do not commit a federal or state crime Haw.
or engage in conduct abroad that
would be a crime under Hawaii law
Violate no criminal law of any unit of Ga.




Do not be charged with a criminal Marion Cnty. (Ind.)
offense based on probable cause
Do not commit a criminal offense or Del.
moving motor vehicle offense
Obey all federal, state, and county Phila. (Pa.)
criminal laws and city ordinances
Obey all state and federal laws Dakota Cnty. (Minn.)
Violate no federal, state, or local law Idaho (felony form)
Ramsey Cnty. (Minn.)
Cuyahoga & Franklin Cntys.
(Ohio)
Allegheny Cnty. (Pa)
Violate no law of this state, any other Dallas, Harris, & Tarrant
state, or the United States Cntys. (Tex.)
Violate no local, state, or federal law or Hennepin Cnty. (Minn.)
ordinance N.J.
Obey all laws. Minor traffic infractions Kootenai Cnty. (Ind.)
will not affect probation status. (misdemeanor form)
San Diego Cnty. (Cal.) (check
box)








Do not violate any laws or ordinances Lake Cnty. (Ill.)
of any jurisdiction, including traffic
regulations
Comply with all municipal, county, Lake Cnty. (Ind.)
state, and federal laws, ordinances,
and orders
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Table 2: "Be Good" Conditions
Rhode
Conditions Georgia Texas California Ohio Island
Keep the Peace and Remain on Statewide
Good Behavior
Be of General Good Behavior Statewide
Avoid Injurious and/or Vicious Statewide Dallas, Harris, and
Habits Tarrant Cntys.
(Tex.)
Do Not Become Abandoned to Statewide
a Vicious Life
Conduct Oneself Properly Hamilton
Cnty.
probation.39 Over time, the conditions became embedded in the routine land-
scape of the law, in part because courts historically waved off arguments that
did raise vagueness challenges without engaging in any extended analysis.40 In
1971, for example, the Court of Appeals of Georgia acknowledged concerns
about a probation condition requiring "general good behavior.,4 The court
noted that even though such conditions "border on the fuzzy and would be open
to differing interpretations, they still pertain to social behavior-in which
society, acting through its courts, has a legitimate interest.42 In 1968, a Court
of Appeal in California held that it saw "no vagueness" in conditions requiring a
probationer to "conduct himself in a law-abiding manner," not to engage in
"criminal practices," and not to become "abandoned to improper associates or a
vicious life."4 3 Without further elaboration, the court simply held that such
terms were not unconstitutionally vague.44 Other courts have held that probation-
ers waive all capacity to challenge conditions on vagueness grounds once they
have agreed to accept a sentence of probation that incorporates those condi-
tions;45 this reasoning is a version of the contract theory of probation discussed
in Part IV.C.
39. It is not uncommon for judges to warn probationers, for example, that they will deal harshly with
a violation of any condition of probation. See, e.g., Swanson v. State, No. 12-01-00132-CR, 2002 WL
335306, at *1-2 (Tex. App. Feb. 28, 2002) (observing that the trial judge had warned the defendant that
a violation of any condition of probation would result in a sentence of 25-99 years); Hernandez v.
State, No. 14-96-00546-CR, 1998 WL 3641, at *3 (Tex. App. Jan. 8, 1998) (noting that the trial judge
warned the defendant that a violation of any of the rules of probation would likely result in a prison term).
40. See, e.g., Rowland v. State, 184 S.E.2d 494, 495 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971) (dismissing a vagueness
challenge to a probation condition that prohibited "indulging in any unlawful, disrespectful or disor-
derly conduct or habits").
41. Inman v. State, 183 S.E.2d413, 415 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971).
42. Id.
43. People v. Jones, 70 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, No. 06-08-00099-CR, 2008 WL 4587282, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct.
16, 2008) (holding defendant had "waived any ambiguity argument" with respect to an "[a]void
injurious or vicious habits" in signing off on probation order imposing the condition (alteration in
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The current usage of the "avoid injurious or vicious habits" condition in
Texas illustrates how confusing these conditions are in practice. The state's
probation statute authorizes the use of this condition, but the statute itself
46provides no indication of its meaning. I therefore compare its semantic
presentation in the state's three most populated counties. Table 3 provides
examples of how the condition appears on the counties' respective judgment
forms and probation websites.
Table 3: "Injurious or Vicious Habits" by Texas County
Texas County Standard Condition
Harris County (includes Avoid injurious or vicious habits. (The use
Houston) of illegal drugs and alcohol.)
Dallas County Avoid injurious or vicious habits.
Tarrant County (includes Fort Avoid injurious or vicious habits and abstain
Worth) from the illegal use of controlled
substances or consumption of any
alcoholic beverage.
A probationer reading the text of the condition, as laid out in these three
counties, could not come away with a clear understanding of what it means to
avoid injurious or vicious habits. In Dallas County, the misdemeanor probation
form simply recites the condition in all its vagueness, offering neither context
nor clarification.47 In Harris County, the parenthetical suggests that "[a]void-
[ing] injurious or vicious habits" means avoiding the "use of illegal drugs and
alcohol."'48 But in Tarrant County, probationers who have been convicted of a
felony must "[a]void injurious or vicious habits" and "abstain from the illegal
use of controlled substances, marijuana, cannabinoids or consumption of any
alcoholic beverage.,49 Thus, avoiding injurious and vicious habits seems to
mean the one thing in Harris County that it cannot mean in Tarrant County. To
the extent that any guidance is provided, that guidance is oppositional.
original) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Douthitt v. State, No. 06-10-00024-CR, 2010 WL 2477866,
at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. June 21, 2010) (same).
46. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § I1(a)(2) (West 2015).
47. Dallas Cnty., Tex., Misdemeanor Probation, supra note 28.
48. See Frequently Asked Questions, HARRIS CNTY. CMTY. SUPERVISION & CORR. DEP'T, http:Ilwww.
harriscountytx.gov/CSCD/faq.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2015) (listing standard conditions of probation
in Harris County).
49. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., Community Supervision, supra note 28. The misdemeanor form for Tarrant
County simply states: "Avoid injurious or vicious habits .... " Tarrant Cnty., Tex., Deferred Adjudica-
tion, supra note 28. Meanwhile, the county-issued handbook for probationers states that standard
conditions of probation can include an order to "avoid injurious or vicious habits" and "abstain from
the illegal use of controlled substances or excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages." CMTY.
SUPERVISION & CORR. DEP'T OF TARRANT CNTY., TEX., PROBATIONER HANDBOOK (2012) (emphasis added).
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Reviewing the implementation of the same condition in other Texas counties
only deepens the confusion. Travis County, the fifth most populous county in
Texas, requires probationers to "[a]void injurious or vicious habits" as the
second condition on a list of "General Conditions of Community Supervi-
sion.",50 The third condition requires probationers to "[a]void the use of all
narcotics, habit forming drugs, alcoholic beverages, and controlled sub-
stances.5' Thus, Travis County's form not only provides no explanation for
what it means to "[a]void injurious or vicious habits," but makes clear that
avoiding the use of drugs and alcohol is an entirely separate prohibition from
avoiding "injurious or vicious habits."5 2
In addition to the be good conditions, many jurisdictions require probationers
to associate with only "good" people.5 3 As shown on Table 4, this kind of broad
associational limitation appears in four of the five states that use probation most
heavily.5 4 In Georgia, Texas, and California, the phrasing is particularly expan-
sive. In these states, probationers are variously instructed to avoid all disrepu-
table, harmful, or improper persons. The probationer is permitted to associate
only with good people, who are presumably the reputable, the harmless, and the
proper.
These conditions run into the same due process problems as the be good
conditions discussed above. Each of the chosen terms is as vague and subjective
as the next. The instructions are purposefully-indeed, rigorously-unclear.
To the limited extent such conditions have been challenged, appellate courts
have tended to uphold the associational prohibitions in terms nearly as broad as
the conditions themselves. In a 2002 case, for example, a Texas court found
that a probationer had failed to "avoid persons or places of disreputable or




53. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.986(e)(3)(6) ("You will not associate with any person engaged in
any criminal activity."); Lake Cnty., Ind., supra note 33 ("I shall avoid former inmates or penal
institutions, and individuals of bad reputation.").
54. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (West 2015) amended on other grounds by 2015 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 61 (S.B. 517) (West); Ga., SC-6.2, supra note 11; Ga., SC-6.3, supra note 11; Dallas Cnty.,
Tex., Community Supervision, supra note 28; Dallas Cnty., Tex., Misdemeanor Probation, supra note
28; Harris Cnty., Tex., supra note 28; Tarrant Cnty., Tex., Community Supervision, supra note 28;
Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, supra note 11.
55. See, e.g., People v. Moses, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 111-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding a
condition of probation that defendant not associate with persons he "knows or reasonably should know"
to be "parolees, convicted felons, users or sellers of illegal drugs or otherwise disapproved by
probation" (emphasis omitted)); Boatner v. State, 717 S.E.2d 727, 728-30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (holding
sufficient evidence to revoke probation when probationer failed to avoid his brother-in-law, who he
knew was on parole); Scroggins v. State, 815 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting
vagueness challenge to probation condition requiring defendant to avoid persons of harmful or
disreputable character). But see People v. Mohrmann, No. H034459, 2010 WL 4720263, at *4-5 (Cal.
Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2010) (striking probation condition that ordered defendant not o "associate with
persons whose behavior might lead to criminal activities").
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harmful character" because he had been seen "at" a crack house.5 6 Although the
court did not indicate that the probationer was ever inside the house, he was
seen "hanging around" the house on one occasion and parked outside the house
on a different occasion. At the revocation hearing, the probation officer
testified that probationers are "not to associate with people who possibly sell
drugs or having [sic] parties, associate in illegal activities or not to go to places
that there is an illegal activity going on.",5 8 Based on this explanation of the
condition's meaning, the court revoked the man's probation and sentenced him
to four years in prison.9
These two sets of conditions-be good and associate with good people-are
designed to leave power firmly in the hands of the probation officer. The
probation officer can decide if the probationer is keeping the peace or remaining
on good behavior. The probation officer can decide who might be a positive
influence and when a relationship should be cut off.
In this sense, the standard Ohio condition included in Table 4 also provides a
great deal of discretion to probation officers, although its language is much
more concrete. In Cuyahoga County, the general rules of probation include the
following condition: "Do not associate with persons having known criminal
records (including convicted co-defendants in your case).",60 By these terms, the
condition seems to ban all communication with anyone who has been convicted
of even the smallest criminal offense, no matter how many ears in the past. But
the probation officer can decide how narrowly to inquire into the probationer's
activities or how strictly to enforce the rule.
Table 4: Limits on Association by State and County
Rhode
Conditions Georgia Texas California Ohio Island
Avoid persons or places of Statewide Dallas, Harris, &
disreputable or harmful Tarrant Cntys.
character
Refrain from becoming Statewide
abandoned to improper
associates
Do not associate with Cuyahoga
persons having known Cnty.
criminal records
56. Willard v. State, No. 07-01-0438-CR, 2002 WL 1807143, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2002).
57. Id.
58. Id. (alteration in original).
59. Id. at *1.
60. Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, supra note 11.
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Other jurisdictions have different forms of associational conditions, although
not all jurisdictions explicitly include these kinds of restrictions. In the federal
system and in Marion County, Indiana, probationers may not associate with a
convicted felon without the approval of the probation officer, a more targeted
version of the Cuyahoga County condition.61 Another Indiana jurisdiction, Lake
County, is even more expansive: probationers must avoid all former inmates
and "individuals of bad reputation.,62 The Idaho Department of Correction has
arguably the most intrusive standard condition in light of the explicit power that
it confers on its officers. It provides that a "defendant shall not associate with
any person(s) designated by any agent of the Idaho Dep[artment] of Correction.63
Examples drawn from the federal supervised release system illustrate how
associational limitations can be enforced in practice.64 In 2014, a judge in the
Eastern District of New York sentenced a defendant to eighteen months in
prison and three additional years of supervised release for associating with a
convicted felon.65 The defendant pleaded guilty to speaking to a member of his
treatment group on the subway following a treatment session, while "knowing
the person had been convicted of a felony, and knowing that he was not
supposed to have contact with other group members outside the treatment
program.,66 In 2014, a judge in the Eastern District of Oklahoma sentenced a
defendant to twelve months in prison for associating with a convicted felon,
even though the defendant argued in mitigation that he had lived with the felon
for fifteen years and considered him "to be family.",67 In 2010, a judge in the
Central District of California sentenced a defendant to nine months in prison for
a number of associational violations.68 The defendant, who had recently com-
pleted a lengthy prison term, was found guilty of working for a convicted felon
and communicating with federal inmates by phone and e-mail.69
61. AO-245B, supra note 21; Marion Cnty., Ind., supra note 27.
62. Lake Cnty., Ind., supra note 33.
63. Idaho Dep't of Corr., Revised Agreement of Supervision, condition 13 (applicable to felony
probation); see also People v. Curiel, No. G032061, 2003 WL 22478155, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3,
2003) (upholding probation condition: "Do not associate with anyone you know your Probation Officer
disapproves of." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 608 F. App'x 707, 709 (10th Cir. 2015) (mem.) (upholding
thirty- six-month revocation sentence based on supervised release violations that included associating
with a convicted felon); United States v. Talksabout, No. 10-79-GF-DLC-RKS-01, 2014 WL 103774, at
*4 (D. Mont. Jan. 8, 2014) (imposing a six month revocation sentence for defendant's use of alcohol
and association with a convicted felon).
65. See United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 250-51 (2d Cir. 2015).
66. Id. at 250. The Second Circuit remanded the case for a fuller explanation of why the judge
decided to sentence the defendant so far above the advisory guidelines range of four-to-ten months
imprisonment. See id. at 249-51, 255-56.
67. United States v. Osborn, 611 F. App'x 939, 940-41 (10th Cir. 2015) (affirming the sentence).
68. United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2010).
69. Id.
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C. WORK AND SUPPORT YOUR FAMILY
In nearly every jurisdiction in my study, working or going to school is a
central requirement of being on probation. Being productively occupied is part
of the definition of what it means not o recidivate.
Some jurisdictions require only that probationers try to work or go to school.
The language used in these jurisdictions, the first group outlined in Table 5,
allows for the possibility that some probationers might not be able to find work
or afford school. Probationers are to go to work or school "insofar as may be
possible," using their best efforts.70 As long as they are trying their hardest, they
are not violating the conditions of their probation.
In each of these jurisdictions, however, the terms used in the condition give
the probation officer the power to decide if the probationer is truly making a
sufficient effort. In Georgia, for example, the probation officer decides whether
the person is doing everything "possible" to "[w]ork faithfully" at a "suitable"
71employment. In Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, the probation officer can
judge whether or not a person is making "every" effort to find and maintain a
job.7 2 Words like every and possible give the officer a great deal of leverage to
enforce his or her own views about how hard a particular probationer is trying.
A second group of jurisdictions hands over control more assertively to the
probation officer. In Florida and the two largest California counties, probation-
ers must work (or go to school) "as directed by [the probation] officer.",7 3 In
Idaho, Delaware and the federal system, the officer can decide whether the
person works, goes to school, or perhaps attends some form of job search
program.4
Some jurisdictions in this second category offer more detail on the kinds of
control a probation officer might wield over a person's employment decisions.
In Idaho, for example, a probationer "shall not accept, cause to be terminated
from, or change employment without first obtaining written permission from
his/her supervising officer.",7 5 In Monroe County, Indiana, the probation officer
70. See, e.g., Ga., SC-6.2, supra note 11 ("Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be
possible.").
71. Ga., SC-6.2, supra note 11; Ga., SC-6.3, supra note 11.
72. Allegheny Cnty., Pa., supra note 29; Montgomery Cnty., Pa., supra note 29; Phila. Cnty., Pa.,
supra note 29; R.I. Dep't of Corr., supra note 11.
73. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.986(e)(3)(8); L.A. Cnty., Cal., Felony, supra note 30; Superior Ct., San Diego
Cnty., Cal., Order Granting Formal Probation; see also Interview with L.A. Pub. Defender (Dec. 18,
2014) (on file with author) (noting this condition is standard for formal probation); Interview with San
Diego Dist. Atty's Office (Dec. 18, 2014) (on file with author) (same).
74. AO-245B, supra note 21; Del. Dep't of Corr., Conditions of Supervision, Level 3 Addendum;
Idaho Dep't of Corr., supra note 63. For case examples, see United States v. Cofield, 233 F.3d 405, 407
(6th Cir. 2000) (upholding two-year prison term based on supervised release violations that included
"failing to maintain gainful employment" and failing to follow "other instructions of his probation
officer"); United States v. White, No. 02-CR-47-BBC-02, 2008 WL 4449980, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 22,
2008) (imposing a twelve-month prison sentence because the defendant had ignored the directions of
his supervising probation officer to find a job and support his dependents).
75. Idaho Dep't of Corr., supra note 63.
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may order a probationer to "participate in classes regarding employment" if the
officer thinks that the person is "under-employed.,76 These conditions give
the probation officer significant power to judge the quality and social worth of
the work that a probationer does.
In a final group of jurisdictions, the probationer must go to work as a
condition of probation, apparently without limitation or exception. Harris and
Tarrant Counties (the first and third largest counties in Texas, respectively)
require the probationer to "[w]ork faithfully at suitable employment.,77 Simi-
larly, a probationer in New Jersey must "maintain gainful employment.7 8 As
presented to a probationer, these conditions do not make any allowance for best
efforts or the inability to find a job. Failing to work is a violation of a clear
condition of probation.79
Many jurisdictions in my study also include supporting dependents as a
condition of probation. As indicated on Table 6, this condition is somewhat less
common than the work or go to school condition. However, it is a condition in
all five states that have the greatest numbers of people on probation: Georgia,
Texas, California, Ohio, and Florida.
The "support your dependents" conditions fall into the same three categories
as the "go to work or school" conditions. In essence, depending on the jurisdic-
tion, the language instructs the probationer: (1) to support your dependents as
much as you possibly can; (2) to support your dependents as much you can at
the direction of your probation officer; or (3) to support your dependents
without regard to what is possible for you right now.
Conditions in the first two categories present the same dynamic in which the
ambiguity of the chosen language transfers power to the probation officer. The
officer gets to decide whether the probationer is trying hard enough to provide
some support (or perhaps full support) to his or her dependents.
The conditions in the third category seem to provide no apparent leeway if
the probationer cannot make ends meet. Dallas and Tarrant Counties simply
instruct the probationer to support his or her dependents (as well as to hold
down a "suitable" job).80 In the federal system, New Jersey, and Lake County,
Indiana, the probationer must also meet his or her "family responsibilities," with
76. Prob. Dep't, Monroe Cir. Ct., Ind., Conditions of Probation.
77. Harris Cnty., Tex., supra note 28; Tarrant Cnty., Tex., Community Supervision, supra note 28.
78. N.J. Judiciary, Standard Conditions of Adult Probation (2007).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 02-20390-CR, 2008 WL 2704454, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 7,
2008) (upholding thirty-day revocation sentence for "failing to maintain full-time legitimate employ-
ment" and failing to support dependents by paying court-ordered child support); Ramirez v. State, No.
08-09-00245-CR, 2011 WL 241954, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2011) (upholding a ten-year
revocation sentence based partly on defendant's "failing to maintain suitable employment as required
by term 8").
80. Dallas Cnty., Tex., Community Supervision, supra note 28; Tarrant Cnty., Tex., Community
Supervision, supra note 28.
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Table 5: Probation Conditions Related to Employment and Schooling
Standard Employment and Schooling
Condition Jurisdiction
Work faithfully at suitable employment Ga.; Franklin Cnty. (Ohio);
in so far as possible Dallas Cnty. (Tex.); Tarrant
Cnty. (Tex.) (misd. prob.)
Make every effort to obtain and maintain Allegheny, Delaware,
employment Montgomery, Phila. Cntys.
(Pa.)
Make every effort to keep steadily R.I.; Hamilton Cnty. (Ohio)
employed or attend school
Maintain verifiable, sustained, gainful Kootenai Cnty. (Idaho) (misd.
employment or participate in prob.)
educational program. A search for
employment will be done in full
earnest.
Work or go to school as directed by PO Marion Cnty. (Ind.)
Check Off: L.A. Cnty. (Cal.)
(fel. prob.); San Diego Cnty.
(Cal.)
Work diligently at a lawful occupation Fla.
as directed by PO
Work full-time or do education program, Ada Cnty. (Idaho) (misd. prob.);
as directed by PO Canyon Cnty. (Idaho) (misd.
prob.)
Maintain gainful, verifiable, full-time Idaho (fel. prob.)
employment or alternative schooling/
employment plan approved by PO
Work or go to school full-time or attend Del. (level 3 supervision)
a job search program or community
service as directed by PO
Work regularly at a lawful occupation, Federal
unless excused by PO for schooling or
other acceptable reason
Obtain/continue employment and/or Lake Cnty. (Ill.)
attend educational programs unless
otherwise ordered by the Court
Work at a lawful occupation and/or DuPage Cnty. (Ill.)
further your education
Seek and maintain gainful employment N.J.
Work faithfully at suitable employment Lake Cnty. (Ind.)
or faithfully pursue study/training that
will equip you for employment
Work faithfully at suitable employment Harris Cnty. (Tex.); Tarrant
Cnty. (Tex.) (fel. prob.)
You shall be employed full-time Allen Cnty. (Ind.)
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the meaning of that term left to the interpretation of the probation officer.8 1
Table 6: Dependent Support Conditions
Standard Support Condition Jurisdiction
Support your legal dependents to the best of Ga.
your ability
Make every effort to support your Hamilton Cnty. (Ohio); Delaware &
dependents Montgomery Cntys. (Pa.)
Support your dependents as required by law Harris Cnty. (Tex.)
Support your dependents to the best of your Fla.
ability, as directed by PO
Support your dependents as directed by PO Check Off: L.A. Cnty. (Cal.)
Support your dependent children Marion Cnty. (Ind.)
Support your dependents DuPage Cnty. (Ill.); Allen Cnty. (Ind.);
Dallas & Tarrant Cntys. (Tex.)
Support your dependents and meet your Federal; N.J.; Lake Cnty. (Ind.)
family responsibilities.
Of course, the stark language of these conditions is meant to create flexibility
in their enforcement. None of the authorities drafting these conditions (whether
they relate to employment or the support of dependents) could assume that all
probationers will satisfy the stated requirements if they only try their very best.
By framing the requirements in absolute terms, the jurisdictions provide the
probation officer with wide latitude in deciding how to press for compliance.
A case from Harris County, Texas, demonstrates how probation officers can
adapt and administer outwardly inflexible conditions in practice. To enforce the
condition that probationers work faithfully at suitable employment, the Harris
County probation department developed a policy that unemployed probationers
"must apply to four jobs each weekday to show sufficient efforts to obtain
employment.'8 2 In 2013, the Court of Appeals of Texas upheld a two-year
prison term imposed on a probationer who had failed to meet this application
quota.8 3 The probationer was faulted in part for being too choosy by applying
81. AO-245B, supra note 21; N.J. Judiciary, supra note 78; Lake Cnty., Ind., supra note 33. For
examples of judges finding violations of the condition requiring the support of dependents, see United
States v. Lancaster, 319 E App'x 886, 887 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding revocation of supervised release
and prison term of eleven months based in part on the failure to support dependents); United States v.
Cruel, No. 6:08-CR-00797-1 -JMC, 2013 WL 5522885, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2013) (imposing prison
term of twenty-one months based in part on failure to pay child support).
82. Reese v. State, No. 01-11-00360-CR, 2013 WL 174562, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2013).
83. Id. at *3.
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"only to jobs related to his trade."814
D. PAY PROBATION FEES
Nearly every jurisdiction in my study has standard conditions of probation
requiring that probationers pay for-or at least contribute to-the costs of their
own supervision. I found provisions for monthly supervision fees in every
jurisdiction except for the federal system.
The exact amount of these fees can be difficult to decipher because the
authorities within a given jurisdiction do not necessarily use a single set of rates
for all probationers. At the low end of the spectrum, as represented by Rhode
Island85 and New Jersey,8 6 the rates are around $20 per month. The highest
range is represented by jurisdictions including Tarrant County, Texas ($60 per
month),8 7 Idaho's statewide probation system for felony offenders ($60 per
month ),88 and Ada County, Idaho ($75 per month).89
Courts also routinely impose other fees on top of the monthly supervision
payments. Courts in Marion County and Allen County, Indiana, for example,
charge probationers an initial user fee and an administrative fee on top of the
monthly supervision fees.90 Many jurisdictions also assess fees for the use of a
public defender.91
My study reveals how endemic fees are in state probation systems, not just in
the jurisdictions that contract with private probation companies. Although the
impact of these fees has come under significant criticism in recent years, the
focus has been heavily skewed toward the role of private probation compa-
nies.92 The widespread imposition of these fees as standard conditions of
probation, however, must be examined in a broader context, as a function of
both private and state-run supervision.
E. STANDARD CONDITIONS FOR SPECIALIZED CASELOADS
Many probation departments have specialized units that impose their own
sets of standard conditions. Some of the probation departments in my study
have specialized units, for example, for intensive supervision programs, ex
84. Id.
85. Probation and Parole: FAQ, R.I. DEP'T OF CORR., http://www.doc.ri.gov/probation/faq.php (last
visited Sept. 10, 2015).
86. See N.J REv. STAT. § 2C:45-1(d)(1) (2013) (authorizing fee of up to $25 per month).
87. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., Community Supervision, supra note 28.
88. Cost of Supervision, IDAHO DEP'T OF CORR., https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/probation and
parole/offender resources/cost of supervision (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
89. See Ada Cnty., Idaho, Supervised Misdemeanor Probation Order.
90. See Allen Cnty., Ind., supra note 11; Marion Cnty., Ind., supra note 27.
91. See, e.g., Canyon Cnty., Idaho, Judgment (stating the Defendant shall "Reimburse for atty or
PD."); Allen Cnty., Ind, supra note 11 (providing for a Public Defender fee); Marion Cnty., Ind., supra
note 27 (assessing either a $50 or $100 "Public Defender" fee, depending on crime of conviction).
92. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA'S "OFFENDER-FUNDED"
PROBATION INDUSTRY (2014) (focusing on the fees charged by private probation companies).
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offender programs, and domestic violence programs.9 3 Probationers in these
units are often subject to a unit-specific set of standard conditions on top of the
regular standard conditions-all in addition to whatever individually tailored
special conditions the judge might craft for a particular probationer.
A comprehensive review of program-specific standard conditions is outside
the scope of this Article. I will use the example of alcohol proscriptions,
however, to illustrate the extent to which program-specific standard conditions
can escalate the constraints on probationers.
Many of the jurisdictions in my study impose a standard condition that
prevents anyone on probation from using or possessing alcohol94 or using
alcohol to excess.95 Some jurisdictions go further and prohibit probationers,
whatever their crime of conviction, from entering any establishment hat serves
alcohol as its main source of revenue.
96
The supplemental alcohol conditions that apply to the Intensive Probation
Supervision Unit in Lake County, Illinois, show just how much a specialized
unit can intensify the nature of these requirements. This unit is theoretically for
people the court would most likely have sent to prison, were it not for the
availability of intensive supervision.97 However, low-level offenders do some-
times end up in the unit.98 The unit description says nothing about any particu-
lar focus on people with alcohol problems.99 Nevertheless, the list of standard
conditions applied through this program includes the following alcohol-related
requirements. The probationer, according to the form, "MUST":
A. Not use, ingest or consume any over-the-counter medication, hygiene
product or other compound or product that contains alcohol.
B. Not reside in any house, apartment unit, condominium unit or other
location where alcoholic beverages are present or regularly consumed.100
On their face, these standard conditions have tremendous implications for a
probationer's daily life. The conditions prohibit a probationer from staying with
any friend or relative who keeps even a bottle of wine in the house. And given
93. See, e.g., CSCD Programs and Services, TARRANT CNTY., TEX., http://access.tarrantcounty.com/en/
community-supervision-corrections/cscd-programs-and-services.html. (last visited Sept. 15, 2015) (list-
ing specialized supervision caseloads).
94. See, e.g., Kootenai Cnty., Idaho, Supervised Probation Order; Prob. Dep't, Cleveland Mun. Ct.,
Ohio, Rules of Community Control Supervision; Harris Cnty., Tex., supra note 28; Tarrant Cnty., Tex.,
Community Supervision, supra note 28.
95. See, e.g., AO-245B, supra note 21; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.986(e)(3)(7).
96. See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Corr., supra note 63.
97. Our Organization, NINETEENTH JUD. CIR. CT. OF LAKE CNTY., ILL., Div. OF ADULT PROB. SERVS.,
http://19thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/Organization/Pages/adtprob home.aspx#ip (last visited Sept. 15,
2015).
98. Interview with Prob. Officer, Lake Cnty., Ill. (Dec. 4, 2014) (on file with author).
99. Id.; see also Lake Cnty., Ill., Felony, supra note 31.
100. See Sex Offender Unit, Lake Cnty., Ill., Additional Conditions of Probation/Supervised Supervi-
sion, conditions A & B.
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the wide variety of daily products that contain alcohol-such as deodorants,
shampoos, toothpastes, soaps, cleaners, and makeup-any probationer would be
hard-pressed to comply with the instruction not to use these products and
compounds. The items defined as contraband have moved far into the realm of
products contained in almost every American house.
III. ENFORCEMENT POWERS TO CONTROL RECIDIVISM
The conditions of probation are enforced through a shadow policing and
adjudication system. These enforcement powers bear little relation to the regular
criminal justice system, even though the same judges preside over both systems.
The enforcement mechanisms that apply to probationers differ from the
normal criminal justice system in three important respects. First, probation
officers have extensive police powers to investigate whether probationers are
complying with the conditions of probation. These powers, which are imposed
as conditions of probation, largely exempt probationers from Fourth Amend-
ment protections. Second, few of the rights fundamental to the criminal justice
system apply in revocation proceedings, the court hearings in which a judge
decides whether a person has violated a condition of probation. Third, probation
officers have extensive powers to punish probationers for a violation of proba-
tion through what are called graduated sanction systems; these systems are
separate from the judicial revocation process.
A. STANDARD POLICING CONDITIONS
1. Monitoring, Reporting, and Visiting Powers
Standard conditions of probation facilitate proactive monitoring by requiring
probationers to report to the probation officer. None of the standard conditions I
uncovered provides any definition of what it means to report: the content of
reporting is left to the discretion of the officer. At a minimum, the reporting
requirement provides the officer with an opportunity to check on compliance
with the other conditions of probation.
In nearly every jurisdiction, the standard reporting condition requires the
probationer to report "as directed" by the probation officer.10 1 Most courts do
not specify any particular reporting interval; instead, they order the probationer
to follow the probation officer's instructions in this regard. In so doing, courts
give the officers the power to decide how often, if at all, the person must report
in person or by some other means, such as by phone or by mail. Thus, although
the fact of surveillance is imposed as a standard condition, the intensity of the
surveillance mechanism is left to the discretion of the probation department.
101. See, e.g., Ga., SC-6.2, supra note 11; Ga., SC-6.3, supra note 11; Harris Cnty., Tex., supra note
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Tied to the reporting requirement is another common enforcement ool: a
condition requiring a probationer to be "truthful" in all dealings with the
probation office. Courts in at least nine of the jurisdictions I studied-Hamilton
County (Ohio), Florida, Michigan, Marion County (Indiana), New Jersey, Idaho,
Ramsey County (Minnesota), and the federal system-include a "be truthful"
requirement as a standard condition of probation. 10 2 This condition creates more
leverage for probation officers in asking questions about compliance, as any
failure to tell the truth can be its own subject of disciplinary enforcement. 1
0 3
Most jurisdictions in my study also allow for unannounced visits from a
probation officer as a standard condition of probation. As reflected on Table 7, a
small number of jurisdictions limit the visit condition to home visits by a
probation officer. But many explicitly contemplate, and therefore promote,
visits at a probationer's place of employment. Still others-indeed, the largest
group-authorize a probation officer to visit a probationer anywhere at all,
including at home or at work.
It is not hard to imagine how these surveillance powers might interfere with a
probationer's ability to maintain a job (another core requirement of proba-
tion). 10 4 A probation officer decides when the probationer must report, including
in-person reporting. But very few people (especially poor people) have flexible
work schedules. The probation officer decides when to visit a probationer at
work. While there, the officer might introduce himself to a boss or insist on
being shown around. Such actions, although consistent with the policing powers
of probation, could damage a probationer's standing at work or the security of
her position.
2. Search Powers
Many courts also impose expansive search conditions to ramp up the investi-
gative and surveillance powers of probation officers. At the narrowest end of
this spectrum, probationers in Hamilton County, Ohio, are subject to a standard
condition that requires them to submit to a search of their person and any bag or
package in their possession. 105 At the other end of the spectrum, as exemplified
by a standard condition in Idaho, courts mandate that people give up all of their
102. See AO-245B, supra note 21; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.986(e)(3)(9); Idaho Dep't of Corr., supra note
63; State of Mich., CC 243(a), supra note 26; N.J. Judiciary, supra note 78; Marion Cnty., Ind., supra
note 27; Cmty. Corr., Ramsey Cnty., Minn., General Conditions of Probation; Prob. Dep't, Hamilton
Cnty., Ohio, General Rules for Probationers.
103. See, e.g., People v. Dighera, No. 305220, 2012 WL 4093702, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012)
(upholding prison sentence in revocation proceedings based on defendant's failure to be truthful with
his probation officer, even though defendant had passed a polygraph test indicating that he had not lied
and argued that the allegations were based on a miscommunication).
104. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of Parole: Rethinking the Role of the State in
Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REv. 421, 447-48 (2011) (examining how parole conditions can interfere with
reintegration, including employment options).
105. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, supra note 102.
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Table 7: Officer Visit Conditions
Standard "Probation Officer Visit"
Condition Jurisdiction
You must allow your PO to visit you at Hawaii; Marion Cnty. (Ill.);
your home. Allegheny Cnty. (Pa.);
Montgomery Cnty. (Pa.)
You are subject to field contacts. Allen Cnty. (Ind.)
You must allow your PO to visit you at Del.; Phila. Cnty. (Pa.)
your home or place of employment.
You must allow your PO to enter your Idaho
home, other real property, place of
employment, or vehicle for the
purpose of visitation, inspections,
and other supervision functions.
You must allow your PO to visit you at Fla.; Harris Cnty. (Tex)
your home, place of employment, or
elsewhere.
You must allow your PO to visit you at N.J.
your home or any other suitable
place.
You must allow your PO to visit you at Federal; Ga.; DuPage & Lake Cntys.
your home or elsewhere. (Ill.); Dallas Cnty. (Tex.) (fel.
prob.); Tarrant Cnty. (Tex.)
Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of being on probation. 1
0 6
Conditions that diminish (or eviscerate) Fourth Amendment rights allow for
deep intrusions into a probationer's privacy, typically permitting searches of a
probationer's home, for example, at any time without notice. The standard
conditions I discovered through my research are meant to ensure that the
enforcement powers of probation are not constrained by normal Fourth Amend-
ment limitations. Representative examples of these conditions are included in
Table 8.
In two important decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a warrantless
search of a probationer when the person was subject to a search condition. The
Court relied on the existence of the search condition in these two cases, which
encourages jurisdictions to adopt these kinds of conditions as standard condi-
tions of probation.
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, a 1987 case, the Supreme Court upheld a probation
regulation that permitted a warrantless search of a probationer's home. 107 This
106. See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Corr., supra note 63.
107. 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
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Table 8: Standard Search Conditions
Sample Standard Search Conditions Jurisdiction
Upon reasonable suspicion, a PO can Allegheny & Montgomery
search you, your vehicle, and your home Cntys. (Pa.)
without a warrant.
You are subject to a person search or Ramsey Cnty. (Minn.);
property search, including vehicle, if Phila. Cnty. (Pa.);
there is a reasonable suspicion that you
have violated any condition of
supervision
On order of my PO, I will submit to a Hamilton Cnty. (Ohio)
search of my person and any purse, bag,
or packages in my possession.
You will submit to a search of your person, Marion Cnty. (Ind.)
vehicle, or property at any time.
You must consent to searches of your Lake Cnty. (Ill.)
person, residence, papers, automobiles,
any device capable of accessing the
internet or storing electronic data, other
personal/real property, emails, texts,
social media websites, cellphones, at any
time a PO requests.
You shall submit at any time to a search N.J.
conducted by a PO without a warrant, of
your person, place of residence, vehicle,
or other personal property.
You shall consent to search and seizure by Cuyahoga Cnty. (Ohio)
any PO or law enforcement officer. Any
search may be done without a warrant
and include your person, property, place
of residence, vehicle, or personal effects.
You shall submit your person and property L.A. Cnty. (Cal.) (felony
to search at any time of day or night, by probation) (Check Box)
any PO or other peace officer, without a
warrant, probable cause, or easonable
suspicion.
You shall consent to the search of your Canyon Cnty. (Idaho)
person, vehicle, real property, and any (misdemeanor probation)
other property at any time and at any
place by any law enforcement officer,
peace officer, or PO, and you waive your
constitutional right to be free of such
searches.
You shall consent to search of your person, Idaho (felony probation)
residence, vehicle, personal property,
and other real property or structures
(owned or leased) conducted by any
agent of the Idaho DOC or law
enforcement officer. You waive your
Fourth Amendment rights concerning
searches.
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regulation authorized a probation officer to conduct a warrantless search as long
as a supervisor approved and there were "reasonable grounds" to "believe the
presence of contraband," defined to include "any item that the probationer
cannot possess under the probation conditions."'108 The Court found that the
regulation was justified by the "special needs" of the probation system to
monitor compliance with the conditions of probation.10 9 In so holding, the
Court emphasized that probationers "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special [probation] restrictions...... o
In United States v. Knights, a 2001 case, the Supreme Court held that no more
than "reasonable suspicion" is required for a police or probation officer to
conduct a warrantless search of a probationer pursuant to a search condition.11
The Court used the reasonable suspicion standard as a ceiling in Knights,
leaving open the question of whether anything less than reasonable suspicion
might be sufficient in the future.
A reasonable suspicion benchmark, although a lesser standard than probable
cause, does provide some check on the warrantless search of probationers. The
reasonable suspicion standard requires "at least a minimal level of objective
justification."'1 12 The officer conducting the search must know that the search
raises "a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing."'
1 13
Despite the invocation of the reasonable suspicion standard in Knights, most
jurisdictions I studied have not explicitly incorporated a reasonable suspicion
limitation into their standard search conditions. The three Pennsylvania counties
studied are an exception: the standard condition in all three counties specifies
that warrantless searches are permissible only with reasonable suspicion.
114
Other jurisdictions-such as Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and the state of New
Jersey-indicate only that a probation officer can conduct a warrantless search
of a probationer's person, home, vehicle, and personal property. 115 The text of
the condition does not provide the probationer (or the probation officer) with
any information on what standard will be used in justifying the search (other
than, implicitly, that probable cause will not be required). A commonly imposed
condition in Los Angeles County, meanwhile, specifies that reasonable suspi-
cion is not required; the condition authorizes searches of probationers and their
property "at any time of the day or night, by any Probation Officer or other
peace officer, with or without a warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspi-
108. Id. at 870-71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. at 873-74.
110. Id. at 874 (alterations in original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
111. 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001).
112. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
113. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009).
114. Allegheny Cnty., Pa., supra note 29; Montgomery Cnty., Pa., supra note 29; Phila. Cnty., Pa.,
supra note 29.
115. N.J. Judiciary, supra note 78; Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, supra note 11.
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cion."'1 16 The standard search condition in Idaho also seems to allow for
suspicionless searches, requiring probationers to forfeit all "Fourth Amendment
rights concerning searches" as a condition of being on probation. 
117
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the legality of suspicionless search
conditions for probationers. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sev-
enth and Ninth Circuits, however, have approved suspicionless earches under
broadly worded probation conditions.118
These policing powers over probationers are greatly enhanced by the fact that
probation officers can use them to enforce any of the myriad conditions of
probation. Unlike in ordinary Fourth Amendment law, there is no requirement
that the officer be investigating a crime. Probation officers are charged with
enforcing all of the conditions of probation, and most conditions do not cover
criminal conduct. Accordingly, a probation officer is empowered to use the
authority granted by a search condition-or a visit condition-to ensure that a
probationer is complying with any of probation's broadly worded standards,
such as not associating with disreputable persons or engaging in injurious or
vicious habits.
Indeed, in many jurisdictions, armed officers conduct unannounced compli-
ance sweeps to check whether probationers are abiding by the conditions of
their probation. In a 2014 San Diego operation entitled "Tip The Scale," for
example, a joint team of sheriff deputies and probation officers looked for
probationers on public transportation who did not have proper tickets; they then
searched these probationers, checked them for warrants, and conducted drug
tests.1 1 9 In Idaho, teams of police officers and misdemeanor probation officers
search through bars for the presence of probationers because probationers are
banned from entering bars as a standard condition of their probation.120 In
Florida, Homeland Security officers have joined with probation officers and
police officers in conducting surprise searches of probationers' homes and
property.
121
116. L.A. Cnty., Cal., Felony, supra note 30.
117. Idaho Dep't of Corr., supra note 63.
118. See United States v. King, 736 F.3d 805, 806 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that "[u]nder
California law, Defendant's agreement to the warrantless search condition as part of his state-court
probation was an agreement o be subject to suspicionless searches"); United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d
690, 692 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding a suspicionless search of a probationer because a blanket waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights was a condition of his intensive probation program).
119. Operation Targets East County Probationers, Parolees, SAN DIEGO CNTY. NEWS CTR. (Feb. 6,
2014, 12:12 PM), http://www.countynewscenter.com/news/operation-targets-east-county-probationers-
parolees.
120. Laurie Welch, Unabashedly Intrusive and Demanding, Misdemeanor Probation Officers Hold
Offenders to Strict Standards, MAGICVALLEY.COM (Oct. 17, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://magicvalley.com/news/
local/mini- cas sia/unabashedly- intrusive- and- demanding- misdemeanor-probation-officers-hold-
offenders-to/article c4468fee- f7a6-1 1e0-90d0-00lcc4c03286.html.
121. Probation Sweep, WSVN (Aug. 7, 2013, 11:01 AM), http://www.wsvn.com/story/23070432/
probation- sweep.
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Importantly, evidence seized in a warrantless search of a probationer can be
introduced both in a violation of probation proceeding and in support of a
separate criminal prosecution. The search does not need to be carried out by
someone actively charged with monitoring compliance with the conditions of
probation. If there is a search condition, the search can be initiated for any law
enforcement purpose, unconnected to any particular "probationary" purpose. 
122
B. THE COURT'S REVOCATION POWERS
Probationers can be arrested and put into revocation proceedings if they are
alleged to have violated any of the conditions of their probation. In Georgia, for
example, the following warning is included as part of the general conditions of
probation: "The Defendant is subject to arrest for any violation of probation. If
probation is revoked, the Court may order incarceration." 123
Significantly, a number of states allow for the possibility of revocation for
conduct not explicitly covered by the conditions of probation. In California,
judges can revoke probation "if the interests of justice so require and the court,
in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation or parole
officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of his or
her supervision" or "has become abandoned to improper associates or a vicious
life." ' 124 The Michigan statute provides that probation orders are revocable for
either a violation, an attempted violation, or for "antisocial conduct or action on
the probationer's part for which the court determines that revocation is proper in
the public interest."125 The Minnesota revocation statute allows the court to
order revocation if it "appears that the defendant has violated any of the
conditions of probation" or "otherwise been guilty of misconduct which war-
rants the imposing or execution of sentence."126 In Idaho, the court can order
revocation if it finds that the probationer has violated any condition of probation
or "for any other cause satisfactory to the court."
' 127
The Supreme Court has severely limited the constitutional protections that
apply to revocation hearings by holding that such hearings are not criminal in
nature. 128 Probationers are not entitled to the presumption of innocence or to a
jury determination of guilt. They have no automatic constitutional right to
appointed counsel or to cross-examine government witnesses. The exclusionary
rule does not apply.
Only the most basic due process protections do apply in revocation hearings.
Probationers have the right to written notice of the claimed violations, the right
122. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 115-18 (2001).
123. Ga., SC-6.2, supra note 11; Ga., SC-6.3, supra note 11.
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (West 2015); see also Prob. Dep't, Orange Cnty., Cal., Instruc-
tions to Adult Probationer (quoting § 1203.2(a)).
125. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 771.4 (West 2015).
126. MINN. STAT. § 609.14(1)(a) (2014).
127. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2602 (2015).
128. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
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to disclosure of the government's evidence, the right to be heard in person, and
the right to present affirmative evidence. At the hearing, probationers can also
confront adverse witnesses as long as the hearing officer does not find good
cause for preventing them from doing so. They are entitled to a "neutral and
detached" hearing body and to a written statement of the reasons for a decision
to revoke their probation. 
129
Perhaps most significantly, the state is not required to prove a violation of
probation beyond a reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubt standard is meant to
effectuate the presumption of innocence in the criminal trial. 130 Courts have
uniformly declined to extend this burden of proof to the revocation context. 
131
They have emphasized that probation revocation is not part of the criminal
process, and a probationer has already been convicted of a crime. 132
Almost all of the jurisdictions in my study apply a preponderance of the
evidence standard at revocation. 133 Only one state, Minnesota, has implemented
a higher standard; its rules require that prosecutors provide clear and convincing
evidence of a violation. 
134
The burden of proof at revocation applies equally to hearings dealing with
claims of new criminal conduct (as a violation of the condition barring such
conduct) and hearings dealing with alleged technical violations. Judges can
imprison probationers for criminal conduct even if they do not believe the state
can prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, judges can revoke
probation because of a new criminal charge, even if the person is acquitted of
the same charge in a criminal trial. Because no distinction is made between
substantive and technical violations, judges can also imprison probationers
under the same standards for any of the broad array of noncriminal actions that
are covered by the conditions of probation.
C. THE PROBATION OFFICER'S SANCTIONING POWERS
The sanctioning authority of the probation officer is arguably more significant
than the revocation power of the judge, and an understanding of probation in the
129. Id. at 786; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972) (explaining that parole
revocation hearings are not criminal in nature).
130. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
131. Note, Winship on Rough Waters: The Erosion of the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 1093, 1102 (1993).
132. United States v. Hooker, 993 F.2d 898, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
133. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-34.1(b) (West 2015); 730 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-4(c) (West
2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-3(f) (West 2015); MICH. C. RULES 6.445(E)(1) (2007); People v.
Stanphill, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Mann v. State, 768 A.2d 470 (Del. 2001)
(unpublished table decision); Odom v. State, 15 So. 3d 672, 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); State v.
Reyes, 504 A.2d 43, 48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); State v. Wagner, 900 N.E.2d 1089, 1090 (Oh.
Ct. App. 2008); Commonwealth v. Castro, 856 A.2d 178, 180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Anderson v. State,
621 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Idaho uses a "satisfactory proof' standard, State v. Rose,
171 P3d 253, 256 (Idaho 2007), whereas Rhode Island uses a "reasonable satisfaction" standard, State
v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479,499 (R.I. 2013).
134. MINN. R. CRIM. P 27.04, subd. 2(1)(c)b (2015).
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United States requires appreciation of that sanctioning authority. In most jurisdic-
tions, probation officers have extensive powers to penalize probationers who
violate the conditions of their probation. Asking a judge to revoke probation and
send the person to prison is only the most dramatic of these options. 135
Under the federal sentencing guidelines, for example, federal probation
officers only need to report alleged felony violations to the court.136 The
probation officer has much more flexibility if the person is suspected of
committing a misdemeanor or a technical violation of probation. 137
The decision not to report this kind of conduct does not mean that the officer
does not sanction the probationer. Indeed, the monograph for federal probation
officers instructs them to respond to "all instances of noncompliance."138 The
monograph warns of the perils of ignoring any conduct that violates a condition
of supervision: "To do nothing in response to any violation, no matter how
minor, only invites further noncompliance. Not responding, or responding with
only covert detection activities, is not a viable option for effective supervi-
sion."139 This monograph applies equally to federally defined probation and
federal supervised release.
The federal monograph provides a list of possible sanctions that probation
officers might use to respond to low severity violations without informing the
court. The monograph defines low severity violations as conduct like minor
traffic infractions and nonrecurring technical violations. For such violations, the
monograph provides a nonexhaustive list of controlling interventions that the
probation officer might decide to impose. These include, for example, deliver-
ing a reprimand, increasing the reporting requirements, restricting travel, or
increasing "overt surveillance." 
140
The monograph provides a separate list of suggested sanctions for moderate
severity violations. These violations are defined to include conduct like recur-
ring technical violations, a positive drug test, or a new nonfelony arrest. The
illustrative sanctions for such violations include measures like intensive supervi-
sion, a curfew, home detention, electronic monitoring, and placement in a
residential reentry center (halfway house) for monitoring. 14 1 When sanctioning
moderate severity violations, the probation officer does need to provide a report
of the sanction to the court. 142
135. See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1039-40 (2013) (noting that probation officers generally have wide authority to
decide how to respond to violations).
136. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.2(a) (2014).
137. See id. § 7B1.2(b).
138. 8E ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES,
SUPERVISION OF FEDERAL OFFENDERS § 620.10(b) (2011).
139. Id. § 620.10(a).
140. Id. § 620.40.10.
141. Id. § 620.40.20.
142. Id.
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For high severity violations, the final category addressed in the federal
monograph, probation officers normally seek revocation from the judge. The
monograph defines high severity violations as chronic violations of low sever-
ity, refusal to comply with court-ordered drug testing, four or more positive
drug tests, or "any felonious conduct (whether arrested or not) that can be
established by preponderance of the evidence."14 3 The monograph notes that
probation officers should request revocation in response to these kinds of
violations "except where special circumstances warrant a less arduous
response." 
144
Over the last two decades, many states adopted similar graduated (or interme-
diate) sanctioning systems to supplement he penalty of revocation. 145 Just as in
the federal system, state probation officers normally deal with lower severity
violations whereas higher severity violations are left for formal revocation
proceedings. In a 2001 handbook on responding to probation violations, for
example, the National Institute of Corrections included a sample "Violation
Response Chart" in its training materials for local probation departments.
146
Under the chart, a probation officer would respond to a low severity violation
by choosing from a group of sanctions, such as a curfew (up to seven days), loss
of travel privileges, or community service (up to eight hours). 147 A supervising
officer would approve the chosen sanction for a moderate severity violation:
these might include, for example, longer curfews (up to thirty days), more
community service (up to forty hours), or electronic monitoring. 148 High sever-
ity violations, meanwhile, would result in a court hearing. 149
In recent years, states concerned about their corrections budgets have pro-
moted an expanded use of graduated sanctions to reduce their reliance on
revocation.1 5 0 Under a 2012 law, for example, the Georgia Department of
Corrections (which runs the state's felony probation system) can administer
graduated sanctions for all technical violations as long as the probationer is
required to submit to graduated sanctions as a condition of probation:
If graduated sanctions have been made a condition of probation by the court
and if a probationer violates the conditions of his or her probation, other than
for the commission of a new offense, [the department] may impose graduated
sanctions as an alternative to judicial modification or revocation of probation,
143. Id. § 620.40.30(a).
144. Id. § 620.40.30(6)(1).
145. See, e.g., Faye S. Taxman & David Soule, Graduated Sanctions: Stepping into Accountable
Systems and Offenders, 79 PRISON J. 182 (1999) (noting that many states had introduced graduated
sanctions as "structured, incremental responses to non-compliant behavior").
146. NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESPONDING TO PAROLE AND PROBATION VIOLATIONS:




150. LAVIGNE ETAL., supra note 11, at 21.
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provided that such graduated sanctions are approved by a chief [probation]
officer. 151
Georgia's judgment form for both misdemeanor and felony probation does
now incorporate a standard condition that the person "agree to the imposition of
graduated sanctions."15 2 Graduated sanctions authorized by statute include, for
example, increased reporting, community service, work crews, treatment pro-
grams, increased drug testing, electronic monitoring, and an intensive supervi-
sion program.153 The failure to comply with any graduated sanction is another
violation of probation. 154
The graduated sanctions matrix used by Georgia's Department of Corrections
reveals just how much power individual probationer officers have to enforce the
kinds of standard conditions explored in this Article. 155 The examples in Table 9
show the punishments probation officers can impose if they determine, for
example, that someone on standard (as opposed to high risk) probation has
failed to maintain employment, failed to support his or her family, or failed to
avoid disreputable persons or places. The probation officer has the discretion to
impose any Level 1 sanction-ranging from community service to bench
duty-for any Level 1 violation.
Some states (inside and outside my study) have allowed probation officers to
impose short jail or prison sentences as administrative sanctions without spe-
cific court approval.15 6 In Delaware and Oregon, for example, the probation
departments have the authority to impose short jail stays as administrative
sanctions.157 The use of these custodial sanctions by probation departments
appears to be a growing trend. For example, the American Legislative Exchange
Council has proposed a model "Swift and Certain Sanctions Act" that would
allow a probation department to sanction a technical violation by imposing a
punishment of up to five consecutive days in a state or local detention facility. 158
At the same time, many probation departments mimic the federal system in
training their officers to respond to each and every violation of a probation
condition. A 2013 report by the American Probation and Parole Association and
the National Center for States Courts insists that "[e]very violation must be met
151. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-23(c) (2015).
152. Ga., SC-6.2, supra note 11; Ga., SC-6.3, supra note 11.
153. GA. CODEANN. § 42-1-1(6) (2015).
154. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-23(d) (2015).
155. Ga. Dep't of Corr., Consistent Sanctions Response Matrix, SOP 11IB09-0001 (2011), available
at http://www.interstatecompact.org/Portals/O/library/statefiles/GA/GA Sanctions Matrix.pdf.
156. LAVIGNE ETAL., supra note 11, at 21.
157. See ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT'L CONE OF ST. LEGISLATURES, PROBATION AND PAROLE VIOLATIONS:
STATE RESPONSES 2 (2008) (noting that short-term incarceration is used as an administrative sanction in
Delaware); Administrative Structured Sanctions, OR. DEP'T OF CORR., http://www.oregon.gov/doc/CC/
pages/structured sanctions.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2015) (noting that jail sanctions can be imposed
by probation officers).
158. AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, SWIFT AND CERTAIN SANCTIONS ACT: MODEL LEGISLATION, available at
http://www.alec.org/initiatives/prison-overcrowding/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
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Table 9: Probation Sanctions in Georgia
Examples of Level 1 Violations in
Georgia's DOC Probation Matrix
Failure to avoid disreputable persons
or places
Failure to avoid bad influences
Failure to obtain/maintain
employment
Failure to comply with
employment/job search directives
Failure to provide family support
Failure to pay fines, fees, costs, or
restitution
Lying to a PO about a material fact
Failing to follow directions/
instructions of PO
Failure to report for required contact
Examples of Sanctions Available to PO
for Level 1 Violations
Impose curfews up to 7 days per sanction
Impose up to 8 hours of community service
per sanction
Institute more frequent searches
Increase reporting requirements
Impose Bench Duty/All Day Reporting
("offender sits on bench at office every
day for 8 hrs/day until ready to seek
employment")
Require a change in residence
Require proof of a certain number of
employment applications
with an anticipated sanction. This eliminates the perception by the probationer
or parolee that some violations have been ignored or excused."159 The Michigan
Policy Directive on the "Probation Violation Process" similarly emphasizes:
"All violations require a response from the supervising field agent, but not all
violations must result in a recommendation for revocation [from] probation."
160
The use of graduated sanctions is an invisible enforcement mechanism.
Unlike revocation proceedings, there is no publicly accessible record of the
alleged violation or the sanction used against a probationer. 161 There is no easy
way to study how the sanctions are deployed in practice or how different
sanctions are used against different categories of people, including minorities. It
is impossible to know about (let alone review) instances in which probation
officers exercise either favorable or unfavorable discretion. Despite he signifi-
cant powers that probation officers have over probationers, those powers oper-
ate largely in the shadows.
IV. THREE TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROBATION'S LEGAL STRUCTURE
In this Part, I examine how courts and probation departments have justified
the two primary structural components of the probation system I mapped out in
159. AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N & NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., EFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO OFFENDER
BEHAVIOR: LESSONS LEARNED FOR PROBATION AND PAROLE SUPERVISION 4 (2013); see also VERA INST. OF
JUST., THE POTENTIAL OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS TO IMPROVE SAFETY AND REDUCE INCARCERATION 18
(2013) (noting "a growing body of research showing the importance of responding to every infraction").
160. MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE: PROBATION VIOLATION PROCESS 1 (2005).
161. See, e.g., Interview with Chief Deputy Pub. Defender, Orange Cnty., Ca. (Oct. 6, 2014) (on file
with author) (noting that probation does not notify the defendant's lawyer of administrative sanctions
imposed on that defendant).
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Parts II and III: the substance of the conditions imposed and the process by
which those conditions are enforced. Having plotted out the contours of the
modern-day system, it should now be possible to cross-check the prevailing
theoretical justifications against the system as it actually exists.
I have located three central theories that have been put forward to support the
legal structure of probation: the benevolent supervisor theory; the privilege
theory; and the contract theory. Courts have drawn from each of these theories
to rationalize and validate the powers of the state to control the lives of those on
probation.
As I will show, these three theories are not necessarily consistent with one
another. But courts tend to pluck from a theory as needed to vindicate the
diminishment of the particular right at issue in a case. Despite some tension
between the theories, each of the theories has become resonant in the cultural
landscape of the law-a familiar and comfortable reference point in explaining
why a probationer must submit to this or that power.
A. THE BENEVOLENT SUPERVISOR THEORY
The benevolent supervisor theory is a construct of the Progressive Era. It was
during this era that adult probation systems first began to spread across the
United States. 162
David J. Rothman has described how Progressive reformers, in fashioning
probation systems between 1900 and 1915, affirmatively "cast the probation
officer in the role of 'friend."'' 163 He explains how this understanding of a
probation officer's role grew out of the tradition of charitable "friendly visit[s]"
to the poor by middle class women in the nineteenth century.164 The premise
behind such visits was that the "friend" would "raise the character and elevate
the moral nature" of the poor through regular and personal influence. 165 Roth-
man quotes Josephine Shaw Lowell, the architect of the friendly visit program,
in explaining its core rationale:
"[A] constant and continued intercourse must be kept up between those who
have a high standard and those who have it not, and that the educated and
happy and good are to give some of their time regularly and as a duty, year in
and year out, to the ignorant, miserable, and the vicious.,'
166
This view of the probation officer as benevolently elevating his or her charge
is evident in training materials from the 1920s. A 1925 pamphlet from the New
162. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PROBATION
26-27 (Wayne L. Morse et al. eds., 1939, rprt. 1960).
163. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRES-
SIVE AMERICA 64 (rev. ed. 2002).
164. Id.
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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York Probation Commission explained: "Probation, by exerting a helpful influ-
ence over those placed under the care of the probation officer, by gradually
changing their habits, associations and manner of life, and by securing the
co-operation of their families and of other persons, reclaims offenders from evil
ways and restores them to proper conduct."16 7 The pamphlet made clear that
only people of the right "character, temperament, ability and interest" should be
appointed as probation officers.168 As the pamphlet explained, "[p]robation
officers should understand human nature and be tactful, sympathetic, resource-
ful and industrious. The point of view of a probation officer should be that of a
friend and helper." 
169
Progressive reformers were comfortable delegating broad discretionary power
to probation officers in the name of realizing this vision. As Rothman has
emphasized: "[T]he probation officer as friend at once promoted and justified
the need for unfettered discretion. One did not tell a friend under what circum-
stances to enter a home, or what questions to ask-so constitutional strictures
about search or self-incrimination were irrelevant."170 The reformers trusted
that probation officers would use their powers compassionately for the good of
the probationer. 
1 71
Unsurprisingly, given this emphasis on discretion, some of the vaguest
modern-day conditions of probation are legacies of the Progressive Era. Califor-
nia's probation revocation statute, for example, contains the same grounds for
revocation as it did in 1903. The statute allows the court to revoke supervision
"if the interest of justice so requires, and if the court, in its judgment, shall have
reason to believe from the report of the probation officer, or otherwise" that the
person "has become abandoned to improper associates, or a vicious life." 172 A
New York probation statute from 1910, meanwhile, included the following
familiar conditions: "That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no unlawful,
disorderly, injurious or vicious habits; (b) shall avoid places or persons of
disreputable or harmful character." 173 New York still has these conditions in its
probation statute,174 as do a number of other states outside my study, including
South Carolina, Alabama, and Kentucky.1 7 5 And both Georgia and Texas, the
two states with the largest probation populations, continue to impose both
conditions. 176
167. N.Y. ST. PROB. COMM'N, ADVANTAGES OF PROBATION: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION AND SOME ILLUSTRA-
TIONS 2 (1925).
168. Id. at 14.
169. Id.
170. ROTHMAN, supra note 163, at 66.
171. Id. at 70.
172. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (1903); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (West 2015).
173. N.Y. CODE CRIM. P. § 11-a(2)(4) (M. Bender & Co. 1914).
174. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 65.10(2)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2010).
175. ALA. R. CRIM. P. Sample Form 49, Order of Probation; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.030 (West
2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-430 (2015).
176. See discussion supra section II.B.
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Courts built up the infrastructure for the revocation of probation with similar
reference to the benevolent purposes of probation. In Riggs v. United States, for
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a
challenge to the district court's revocation powers shortly after the enactment of
federal probation.177 The district court had sentenced Riggs to four years
probation in 1925 as a result of a conviction under the National Prohibition
Act. 178 The court later revoked Riggs's probation and sentenced him to four
years in prison because of a subsequent violation of the Prohibition Act. 17 9 In a
subsequent appeal, Riggs argued that he was entitled to a trial on whether he
had violated the conditions of his probation.180 Although acknowledging the
merits of Riggs's argument, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the good intentions
behind the statute:
The question of procedure under the Probation Act is not free from difficulty,
especially because of the great latitude conferred upon the District Judges in
enforcing the same. Manifestly many things may be done that ought not o be,
and the doing of which would tend to make questionable some of the
provisions of the act, because of the far-reaching and unreasonable restraints
and embarrassments that might be placed upon the rights of an accused. The
act should not, however, be viewed in the light of the unreasonable things that
may be done under it, but rather having regard to its general purposes, and the
wise and humane things that should be done in its due administration, looking
to the amelioration of the condition of the unfortunate in whose behalf it was
enacted. 18 1
The Court justified the lack of procedure because wise and humane things
should be done with the authority the statute conveyed; "[t]he purpose of the act
was to give to the federal District Courts a free ha[n]d in humanely dealing with
criminal classes which come before them . ,82
Approximately fifty years later, the Supreme Court provided for some limited
procedural protections during the revocation process. A 1972 case, Morrissey v.
Brewer, applied these protections to the revocation of parole.183 In 1973, in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Court applied these same protections to the revocation
of probation. 184 Under these cases, probationers and parolees were entitled to
notice of their alleged violations and an opportunity to appear and present
evidence on their own behalf. 185 They also had a conditional right to confront
177. 14 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1926).
178. Id. at 5.




183. 408 U.S. 471,482 (1972).
184. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
185. Id. at 786.
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adverse witnesses (unless the judge denied this right for good cause) and to a
written report of the judge's decision on the violation. 186
The Court in Gagnon found this limited mix of due process rights sufficient
for probationers because of the purportedly caring and supportive character of
the probation system. 187 In particular, the Court declined to provide indigent
probationers with an automatic right to appointed counsel in revocation proceed-
ings based on its vision of the probation officer's role. It emphasized: "While
the parole or probation officer recognizes his double duty to the welfare of his
clients and to the safety of the general community, by and large concern for the
client dominates his professional attitude."188 The Court stressed that the legal
system had traditionally entrusted the probation officer with broad discretion
precisely because the officer's "function is not so much to compel conformance
to a strict code of behavior as to supervise a course of rehabilitation."'189 Thus,
the Court reasoned, the probation officer would approach a revocation decision
with a rehabilitative, rather than punitive aim: treating revocation "as a failure
of supervision."'1 90 Similarly, the Court suggested that the presence of counsel at
revocation hearings might subvert the judge's own role as the ultimate benevo-
lent supervisor. Formalizing the procedure by providing lawyers could make the
hearing body "less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure
to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation." 1 91
In 1987, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court returned to the benevo-
lent supervisor theory in upholding a regulation that permitted the warrantless
search of a probationer's home. 192 In holding it appropriate to dispense with the
warrant requirement, the Court stressed that it would be a probation officer-
and not a police officer-who would carry out the search.19 3 The Court under-
scored that the probation officer was "an employee of the State Department of
Health and Social Services who, while assuredly charged with protecting the
public interest, is also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer
(who in the regulations is called a 'client')." 
194
Justice Blackmun, in a dissent joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan,
expressed puzzlement that the Court would invoke the supposed altruism of the
probation officer to justify the warrantless search.19 5 He faulted the majority for
its "curious assumption that the probationer will benefit by dispensing with the
186. Id.
187. Id. (noting that these due process measures "serve as substantial protection against ill-
considered revocation").
188. Id. at 783 (quoting FRANK J. REMINGTON ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION: MATERIALS AND
CASES 910-11 (1969)).
189. Id. at784.
190. Id. at 785.
191. Id. at 788.
192. 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987).
193. Id. at 876.
194. Id. (citation omitted).
195. Id. at 886 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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warrant requirement." 196 He emphasized:
[T]he benefit that a probationer is supposed to gain from probation is rehabili-
tation. I fail to see how the role of the probation agent in "foster[ing] growth
and development of the client" is enhanced the slightest bit by the ability to
conduct a search without the checks provided by prior neutral review. If
anything, the power to decide to search will prove a barrier to establishing any
degree of trust between agent and "client."
197
Each of these cases, in letting the rights of the probationer derive from the
theory of the benevolent supervisor, is invoking a form of the parens patriae
principle. This principle empowers the state to care for those who cannot care
for themselves.198 Because the state is focused on caring for the probationer (for
example, bringing about his or her rehabilitation), the interests of the state and
the probationer are not adverse.1 99 The parenting role of the state obviates the
need for due process protections to protect the probationer from the state.
Not surprisingly, those who seek to expand enforcement powers over proba-
tioners typically invoke the language of parenting. The majority in Griffin, for
example, used explicit parenting language to explain why a warrant requirement
would make it unnecessarily difficult to respond to evidence of a probationer's
misconduct. The Court rationalized its decision in the following terms: "By way
of analogy, one might contemplate how parental custodial authority would be
impaired by requiring judicial approval for search of a minor child's room.,
20 0
Advocates of swift and certain sanctions, the latest trend in the enforcement
of probation conditions, also invoke a parenting model to justify the use of this
power over probationers. In describing the impetus behind Hawaii's Opportu-
nity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE), for example, Judge Steven Alm
explained: "I thought about how I was raised and how I raise my kids. Tell'em
what the rules are and then if there's misbehavior you give them a consequence
immediately. That's what good parenting is all about.,20 1 The American Proba-
tion and Parole Association (APPA) has also used the language of parenting to
push for the implementation of swift and certain sanctions for violations.20 2 The
APPA argues that a probationer who knows that a sanction will be imposed
,.may be likened to a child knowing about his parents' rules, knowing the
196. Id. (emphasis omitted).
197. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. E.g., Parens Patriae, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
199. See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("In a real sense the Parole Board in
revoking parole occupies the role [of] parent withdrawing a privilege from an errant child not as
punishment but for misuse of the privilege.")
200. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.
201. Sam Komell, Probation that Works, SLATE (June 5, 2013, 6:45 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
health and science/science/2013/06/hawaii hope probation program reduces crime drug use and
time in prison.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. AM. PROB. & PAROLE Ass'N & NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 159, at 4.
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consequences for breaking those rules prior to the occurrence of any infraction,
and knowing that the consequences will for sure occur if the rules are broken.20 3
The use of the parenting analogy is a subtle nod to the benevolent supervisor
theory. If a parent wants to do it, it must be for your own good. It must be for
your own good, even if it seems painful in the moment. A parent has your best
interests at heart.
One problem with this analogy is the disconnect between the parental author-
ity that is invoked and the enforcement powers that are sought. The HOPE
model, for example, calls for the immediate imposition of a jail sanction
(starting with a few days in jail) for a positive drug test or a missed appoint-
ment.20 4 The length of the jail sanction increases with each subsequent viola-
tion.20 5 This kind of sanction is not among the tools a typical parent would
select.
Whether revocation (or a few days in jail) represents a failure or success of
supervision depends on the goals of the probation system. If public safety is the
predominant goal, then locking people up is a measure of success.20 6 The
probation officer is doing his or her job by routing out violations and keeping
the community safe, assuming that these kinds of sanctions can be shown to
increase compliance.20 7
Public safety is, indeed, now often claimed to be the dominant goal of
probation. As David Garland has documented, there has been a profound shift in
the ideology of probation departments in recent decades: a retreat from their
early welfarist ambitions and a growing emphasis on control and risk monitor-
ing functions.208 The goal is still changing the behavior of the probationer. But
the real focus is on enforcing discipline to protect the public, not on finding
ways to improve the life of the offender.20 9 And yet, the conditions of probation,
and the legal justifications for the ways in which they are enforced, still reflect
the benevolent supervisor theory, with its emphasis on the offender's personal
growth.
The websites of the departments of probation in my study signal just how far
the tide has turned. "Enhancing Public Safety, Holding Felons Accountable" is
the tagline, for example, of the Probation Supervision Division of the Georgia
203. Id.
204. ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, MANAGING DRUG INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH SWIFT AND
CERTAIN SANCTIONS: EVALUATING HAWAII'S HOPE 9 (2009).
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME & JUST. 99, 105
(1996) (noting that from a "the law must keep its promises" perspective, a higher probation failure rate
is good).
207. See Stephanie A. Duriez et al., Is Project HOPE Creating a False Sense of Hope? A Case Study
in Correctional Popularity, 78 FED. PROB. 57, 67 (2014) (emphasizing that "evaluations of HOPE and
its adaptations are few in number and have produced mix results" and are also "metholodologically
limited").
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Department of Corrections.210 Within this framework, there is nothing painful
(or even regrettable) about imposing a jail or prison sanction or, indeed, in
imposing any of the intermediate sanctions that a probation officer has the
authority to use. Mark Kleiman, one of the most forceful advocates of HOPE,
has described probation officers' enthusiasm over the new jail sanctions: the
officers in Hawaii "have become fervent fans as they've discovered the exhilara-
tion of being able to exercise in practice the authority over their clients that they
possess in theory.
' 2 11
The imposition of swift and certain sanctions, moreover, has eliminated any
space for the kind of individualized "concern for the client" relied on by the
Supreme Court in Gagnon. Kleiman has warned supervisors (whether judges or
probation officers) against exercising any favorable discretion for a probationer
who has violated a condition covered by the program. He has emphasized: "The
temptation on the part of probation officers and judges to cut an erring proba-
tioner some slack 'just this once' can be disastrous; when consistency is the
name of the game, mercy is toxic. ' 2 12 Sanction hearings are to be quick and
summary.213
The modern-day emphasis on sanctioning powers may be chalked up to
changing times and democratic processes. It is important to note, however, that
the legal structure of probation was built on the back of a distinctly different,
Progressive worldview. The Supreme Court justified the lack of constitutional
protections for probationers (and the breadth of the conditions imposed upon
them) by relying on the Progressive vision of the probation officer as friend.
That vision is now fading into a model of the probation officer as strict enforcer
of the rules. Even if this model proves effective in achieving compliance with
certain rules of probation,214 it is in direct conflict with the model relied on by
the Supreme Court in Gagnon.
B. THE PRIVILEGE THEORY
Courts have also long justified limiting the rights of probationers by emphasiz-
ing that probation is a privilege.215 The central idea behind this theory is that
210. Probation Supervision, GA. DEP'T OF CORR., http://167.192.44.227/Divisions/Corrections/
ProbationSupervision/ProbationSupervision.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
211. Mark A. R. Kleiman, Jail Break: How Smarter Parole and Probation Can Cut the Nation's
Incarceration Rate, WASH. MONTHLY (July/Aug. 2009), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/
2009/0907.kleiman.html.
212. Mark A. R. Kleiman, A New Role for Parole, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2013, available at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january february 2013/features/a new role for parole
042045.php?page- all.
213. Kleiman, supra note 211 (noting that the average HOPE sanction hearing lasts seven and a half
minutes).
214. See, e.g., Duriez et al., supra note 207, at 57 (noting that the effectiveness of the swift and
certain sanction model for handling probation violations needs to be evaluated more extensively).
215. Judah Best & Paul I. Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 GEO. L.J. 809, 811-12
(1963).
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every probationer would be in prison but for the grace of the court. Probationers
receive a discount from the normal and appropriate prison sentence for their
crimes. Thus, the state's powers over a probationer are justified because they are
the trade-off for keeping the probationer out of prison. This notion is so
entrenched in the law that even if other people receive a lesser sentence for the
same crime-such as a deferred prosecution or a dismissal-the grant of
probation still remains legally synonymous with privilege.
In a 1932 case, Burns v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court first set forth
the privilege rationale in upholding a sentence for a person who had violated the
terms of his probation.2 16 The district court had sentenced Burns on multiple
counts: one year in custody under one of the counts and five years in custody,
execution suspended during five years of probation, under another count.2 17
While simultaneously on probation and serving the one year custodial sentence,
Burns was allowed to leave the jail periodically in order to visit the dentist. One
day, a federal agent discovered him at home, when he was supposed to be at the
dentist. The court revoked his probation, imposing the suspended five-year
prison sentence.2 18 Burns appealed the sentence, arguing that he should have
received a violation hearing with more due process protections.2 19 In rejecting
his appeal, the Court emphasized that Burns could not look a gift horse in the
mouth:
Probation is ... conferred as a privilege, and cannot be demanded as a right.
It is a matter of favor, not of contract. There is no requirement that it must be
granted on a specified showing. The defendant stands convicted; he faces
punishment, and cannot insist on terms or strike a bargain.2 20
In a 1935 case, Escoe v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court affirmed that constitu-
tional protections did not apply to decisions to grant or revoke probation
because probation was "an act of grace to one convicted of a crime., 221 The
Court held that the privilege of probation was based on statute and not on the
Constitution. Thus, any procedural protections provided at revocation-such as
notice or a hearing-also had to be creatures of statute. The Due Process Clause
did not compel any such protections because being on probation was a privilege
rather than a right.222
In Morrissey and Gagnon, the Supreme Court rejected this "right" versus
"privilege" distinction and held that the Due Process Clause did extend to the
216. 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
217. Id. at 217.
218. Id. at218-19.
219. Id. at 219.
220. Id. at 220.
221. 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935).
222. ld. at 493.
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revocation of parole and probation.22 3 In Morrissey, the Court emphasized that
the revocation of parole inflicted a "grievous loss" on a parolee.2 24 As the Court
explained, "[b]y whatever name, the liberty [of a parolee] is valuable and must
be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination
calls for some orderly process, however informal.,225 One year later, the Court
in Gagnon extended this holding to the revocation of probation.22 6 The Court
emphasized: "It is clear at least after [Morrissey] ... that a probationer can no
longer be denied due process, in reliance on the dictum ... that probation is an
'act of grace.' 22 7
At the same time, to preserve flexibility at revocation, the Morrissey Court
held that only a "few basic requirements"228 were necessary. These were the
package of due process protections outlined in my earlier discussion of Morris-
sey and Gagnon.22 9
Writing in 1972, the Justices in Morrissey noted that a grant of parole or
probation could no longer meaningfully be characterized as an act of grace,
given how routinely they were imposed. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice
Burger observed that "[r]ather than being an ad hoc exercise of clemency,
parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals.2 30
Justice Douglas emphasized the point more strongly in a partial dissent, which
pushed for more due process protections at revocation than the majority had
provided. 231 He stressed how much the criminal justice system had "come to
depend" on probation and parole:
A fundamental problem with [the right-privilege] theory is that probation is
now the most frequent penal disposition just as release on parole is the most
frequent form of release from an institution. They bear little resemblance to
episodic acts of mercy by a forgiving sovereign. A more accurate view of
supervised release is that it is now an integral part of the criminal justice
process and shows every sign of increasing popularity.
232
Justice Douglas was correct in predicting that the use of probation (and
parole) would only continue to grow. If probation was a common sentence in
1972, its use has become ever more routine. As reflected in Table 10, 816,525
adults were on probation in the United States as of 1977, the first year that the
223. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972) (explaining and then rejecting the "right" versus "privilege" distinction).
224. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
225. Id.
226. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782.
227. Id. at 782 n.4.
228. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490.
229. See discussion supra Part IVA.
230. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477.
231. Id. at 499-500 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 493 n.3 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Bureau of Justice Statistics began keeping nationwide probation statistics.2 33 By
2013, this number had ballooned to nearly four million adults-a nearly 400%
increase.2 34 Over the same period, the resident population of the United States
235grew by roughly 50%. Although the number of adults in prison and on parole
also increased dramatically during this timespan, the probation population
continues to dwarf even these sizable populations.
Table 10: Relative Increase in Probation
236
State and Federal State and Federal State and Federal
Adult Prison Populations Adult Probation Populations Adult Parole Populations
1972: 196,092 1977: 816,525 1975: 143,164
2013: 1,574,741 2013: 3,910,647 2013: 853,215
Despite the number of people now serving probation sentences, many courts
have declined to heed Justice Douglas's warning and continue to use the same
privilege rationale to justify the limited rights afforded people on probation.
Georgia courts, for example, rely heavily on the privilege theory to rationalize
the extensive powers the state exercises over probationers:
[A] person occupies a special status while on probation, during which time his
private life and behavior may be regulated by the State to an extent that would
be completely untenable under ordinary circumstances. The rationale for this
power is basically, of course, that the person has been convicted of a crime
and would be serving a sentence but for the grace of the court.237
Georgia courts continue to characterize (and defend) probation as a privilege
without acknowledging that their own heavy use of probation undercuts the
privilege rationale. At the end of 2013, Georgia had more than eight times as
many people on probation (514,477)238 as it had sentenced to prison or jail
233. Adults on Probation, Federal and State-By-State, 1977-2012, BUREAU OF JUST. STA. (Dec. 19,
2013), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfmty- pbdetail&iid- 2026.
234. See id.
235. See United States Population by Year, MULTPL, http://www.multpl.com/united-states-population/
table (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
236. For the 1972 prison population statistic, see BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS, 1925-85, at 2
tbl.1 (1986). The 1975 parole population statistic is from BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., ADULTS ON PAROLE IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1975-2012 (2013). The probation statistics are from Adults on Probation, Federal
and State-By-State, 1977-2012, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/index.
cfm?ty-pbdetail&iid-2026. For the remaining statistics, see GLAZE & KAEBLE, supra
note 1.
237. Staley v. State, 505 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
238. HERBERMAN & BONCZAR, supra note 13, at app. tbl.2.
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(61,620).239
These figures contradict any notion that probation represents a categorical
discount in Georgia. Undoubtedly, Georgia courts do take a chance on some
defendants, imposing probation when a prison term might be the going rate (the
"correct" sentence) for the crime in question. But in many situations, probation
is simply the normal, default sentence.24 0 It is not a privilege (or a bargain) in
any meaningful sense of that word.
Georgia could not afford to incarcerate all of the people currently on proba-
tion, making probation a "systematic imperative," rather than a grant of discre-
tionary leniency.24l The state is already groaning under the costs of its corrections
spending.24 2 Its annual corrections budget has swelled to over one billion
dollars, as the number of prison inmates has doubled over the last two de-
cades. 3 In 2011, the state general assembly convened a special council on
criminal justice reform to find ways to reduce the state's costly reliance on
incarceration.2 44
Like Georgia, nearly all of the jurisdictions in my study continue to character-
ize probation as a privilege, despite the size of their probation systems. Texas,
the state with nearly as many people on probation as in Georgia, provides
another telling example. Its courts emphasize that placement on community
supervision "is a privilege, not a right" and that supervision "benefits" the
probationer.2 4 5 California, the state with the next highest probation population,
routinely rejects challenges to probation conditions by emphasizing that "proba-
tion is 'an act of clemency and grace,' not a matter of right.' ' 24 In dismissing
these challenges, the appellate courts in California sweep away concerns about
how deeply some of the routine conditions impinge on defendants' constitu-
tional rights; after all, they assert, a defendant is free to reject the privilege of
239. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2013, at 3 (2014) (54,004 prisoners); OFF. OF RES., GA.
DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, COUNTY JAIL INMATE POPULATION REPORT 1 (2013) (7,616 sentenced inmates in
jails).
240. See, e.g., Andrew Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences: Overincarceration
and the Erosion of Due Process, 75 BROOK. L. REv. 753, 754 (2010) (noting that probation is now "the
default sentence imposed upon a majority of defendants with little to no regard for whether probation
makes sense for that defendant").
241. See SANFORD H. KADISH ETAL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1006 (8th ed. 2007) ("Criminal
statutes now commonly permit (or purport to require) draconian punishments that no one expects to be
imposed in the typical case" meaning that "[l]eniency has therefore become not merely common but a
systemic imperative." (internal qutotation marks omitted))
242. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM FOR GEORGIANS 5 (2011).
243. Id. at 2.
244. Id. at 5.
245. Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 533-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (noting that placement on
community supervision "is a privilege, not a right"); Ramos v. State, No. 03-10-00705-CR, 2013 WL
1876577, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013) (same).
246. People v. Anderson, 235 P3d 11, 20 (Cal. 2010) (citations omitted) (quoting People v.
Rodriguez, 51 Cal. 3d 437, 445 (Cal. 1990)); see also People v. Fritchey, 2 Cal. App. 4th 829, 835 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) ("A grant of probation is not a matter of right, but an act of clemency designed to allow
rehabilitation.").
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probation and to submit to incarceration instead.
24 7
The notion that probation is a privilege in Texas and California is as question-
able as it is in Georgia. As noted in Table 11, both Texas and California already
have probation populations that far exceed the number of sentenced inmates in
their prisons and jails.24 Both states have notoriously overburdened and expen-
sive prison systems. Texas incarcerates more people than any other state.2 49 And
in 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held that California's prison system was so
overcrowded that the state could not provide constitutionally adequate medical
care to all of the people it was choosing to imprison.2 5 0 The Court's decision
forced California to reduce its prison population, which has resulted in the state
pushing even more people to the supervision of county probation departments.1
Table 11: Probation Compared to Jail and Prison
Probation Prison Jail
Jurisdiction December 2013 December 2013 December 2013
Georgia sentenced adults 514,477 54,004 7,616
Texas sentenced adults 399,655 168,280 15,847
California sentenced adults 294,057 135,981 30,784
Rather than providing an escape from an otherwise certain term of incarcera-
tion, probation has increased the capacity of the criminal justice system to
control more defendants for longer periods of time while expending fewer
resources. The existence of probation has not displaced incarceration or lowered
the number of people sentenced to prison in any significant way. The United
States incarcerates a greater percentage of its people than any other nation, even
though probation has been widely available in this country for over a hundred
years. As judges sentence record numbers of people to prison, they are sentenc-
ing roughly twice as many people to probation at the same time. In a large
sense, probation has simply widened the net. It has allowed prosecutors to
247. See, e.g., People v. Olguin, 198 P3d 1, 4 (Cal. 2008) ("If a defendant believes the conditions of
probation are more onerous than the potential sentence, he or she may refuse probation and choose to
serve the sentence."); Klingele, supra note 135 (noting that because probation is viewed as an act of
grace, courts are free to impose almost any conceivable condition of release with little appellate
review).
248. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 239, at 3 (reporting the prison population for Georgia,
Texas, and California at the end of 2013); HERBERMAN & BONCZAR, supra note 13, at app. tbl.2
(reporting the adult probation population for Georgia, Texas, and California at the end of 2013); CAL.
BD. OF ST. & CMTY. CORRS., JAIL PROFILE SURVEY: FOURTH QUARTER CALENDAR YEAR 2013 SURVEY RESULTS
6 (reporting sentenced inmates in California jails); GA. DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, supra note 239
(reporting sentenced inmates in Georgia jails); TEX. COMM'N ON JAIL STANDARDS, ABBREV. POP. REPORT
FOR 1/1/2014 (2014) (reporting sentenced inmates in Texas jails).
249. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 239, at 3.
250. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1917-21 (2011).
251. REBECCA SULLIVAN SILBERT, THINKING CRITICALLY ABOUT REALIGNMENT IN CALIFORNIA 5 (2012).
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charge ever more cases because probation provides a cheaper method of impos-
ing a sanction.
Observing the system at the beginning of the 1970s, David Rothman recog-
nized the early signs that probation was not being used as an alternative to
incarceration.2 Instead, it simply increased the number of people being brought
under the control of the criminal justice system. Rothman noted that the
introduction of probation "allowed the state to exert legal authority over a group
of people who would have otherwise been left to their own devices.25 3 This
trend has only accelerated since the 1970s.
In a significant number of cases, moreover, probation is a comparatively
harsh sentence. Many of the smallest criminal cases end in probation. As many
as eighty percent of misdemeanor convictions result in probationary sen-
tences. 4 Instead of dismissing one person's case, a prosecutor might insist on a
plea to a misdemeanor and a term of probation. In another case, the prosecutor
might object to the defendant's participation in a diversionary program and
demand that the person accept probation to avoid the risk of going to jail.
Incarceration may not be the normal outcome for most small cases, but incarcera-
tion being authorized even in the smallest cases gives prosecutors leverage to
press for a term of probation whenever they choose. Some defendants who
receive probation are simply unlucky. They receive probation when others
under similar circumstances would not have been prosecuted at all-or if
prosecuted, would have had their cases dismissed as a function of prosecutorial
discretion. And if probation were not an available option, it is a practical and
logistical certainty that the entire pool of probationers would not be incarcerated
instead.
States have also been making probation sentences harsher (and even less of a
privilege) by allowing for probation to be combined with jail or prison. All of
the states in my study provide judges with easy mechanisms for imposing a
sentence of incarceration with an additional sentence of probation.
Most states combine prison and probation by providing for split sentences.
Judges might impose a specific term of incarceration followed by a specific
term of probation. In Pennsylvania, for example, judges regularly sentence
defendants to a term of incarceration followed by a "tail" of probation. In the
federal system, judges almost always impose a fixed period of supervised
release (a form of probation) to be served after the conclusion of the prison
term. 6
Alternatively, judges in some jurisdictions impose a term of incarceration,
suspend a portion of this incarceration term, and then follow it with a period of
252. ROTHMAN, supra note 163, at 12.
253. Id. at 111.
254. Petersilia, supra note 15, at 173.
255. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 127 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (noting that
probation "may be employed in conjunction with confinement as a 'tail.').
256. Doherty, supra note 7, at 1015.
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probation. The person goes on probation after serving the portion of the
custodial term that was not suspended; the balance of the custodial term then
hangs over the probationer's head during the period of probation. The judgment
forms for both felony and misdemeanor probation in Georgia, for example,
provide the option of either straight probation or a combination of confinement
and probation. To impose both incarceration and probation, the judge simply
fills in the following slots on the state's official judgment form: "The Defendant
is sentenced for a total of __ , with the first __ to be served in confinement
and the remainder to be served on probation .... 2 7 By making it simple, the
form invites this outcome.
Although seemingly counterintuitive, a significant number of jurisdictions
also allow for a term of prison or jail as a special condition of probation. The
County of Los Angeles, which administers the world's largest probation depart-
ment,258 provides for a variety of custodial options on its judgment forms.25 9 In
sentencing a defendant to probation for a misdemeanor, a Los Angeles judge
might decide to check a box to require the defendant to serve a certain number
of days in the Los Angeles County jail.260 Alternatively, the judge might check a
box to order confinement on consecutive weekends.261 Other jurisdictions,
including Texas, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and New Jersey, provide for
similar powers in their probation systems.262
The widespread use of probation in conjunction with incarceration is hasten-
ing the demise of probation as an alternative to incarceration, making it ever
more of a supplement, not an alternative, to incarceration. The original idea of
probation, as explained by the Supreme Court in 1928, was the avoidance of
prison.263 Probation ameliorated the sentence by "delaying actual execution or
providing a suspension, so that the stigma might be withheld, and an opportu-
nity for reform and repentance granted before actual imprisonment should stain
the life of the convict.,264 In drafting its influential 1955 model probation act,
the National Probation and Parole Association (NPPA) sought to hold this line,
257. Ga., SC-6.2, supra note 11; Ga., SC-6.3, supra note 11.
258. Did You Know, L.A. CNTY. PROB. DEP'T, http://probation.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/probation/!ut/p/
b0/04 Sj9CPykssyOxPLMnMzOvMAfGjzOLdDAwM3P2dgo0snPOtDRzdvQOMLYx9DQI9zfQLshVA
ShJ2Ow!/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
259. See L.A. Cnty., Cal., Felony, supra note 30; L.A. Cnty., Cal., Misdemeanor, supra note 30.
260. L.A. Cnty., Cal., Misdemeanor, supra note 30.
261. Id.
262. See 730 ILL. COME STAT. 5/5-6-3(b) (2015) (providing that courts can require probationers to
serve a term of periodic imprisonment); IND. CODE § 35-38-2-2.3(c) (2015) (allowing judges to impose
consecutive or intermittent intervals of imprisonment as a condition of probation); MICH. COMp. LAWS
§ 771.3(2)(a) (2015) (empowering judges to impose a condition of probation requiring confinement in
county jail for up to twelve months in consecutive or nonconsecutive intervals); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:43-2(b)(2) (West 2015) (authorizing judges to impose up to 364 days of confinement as a
condition of probation); Johnson v. State, 286 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (noting that a
judge can impose confinement in jail as a condition of community supervision at any time during the
supervision period).
263. Cook v. United States, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928).
264. Id.
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defining probation strictly as a mechanism to avoid the imposition of incarcera-
tion. Probation was a "procedure under which a defendant, found guilty of a
crime upon verdict or plea, is released by the court, without imprisonment,
subject to conditions imposed by the court and subject to the supervision of the
probation service.,265 The NPPA stressed its strong opposition to any system
that combined probation with incarceration:
The probation definition is constructed to exclude the practice of some courts
of combining a period of imprisonment with probation to follow. Such a
disposition is a contradiction in terms and in concept and is condemned. The
purpose of probation is to avoid, where it is feasible, the impact of institu-
tional life.
266
Despite the NPPA's best efforts, the combined use of incarceration and
probation is now a (largely unexamined) norm.
In a world where probation is becoming less of an alternative to prison, and is
instead routinely applied either in addition to prison, or in situations where
prison would not have been imposed, the privilege theory has significant
structural weaknesses.
C. THE CONTRACT THEORY
In some instances, particularly in justifying expansive search conditions,
courts have upheld conditions under a contract theory of probation. Courts in
various states in my study-including California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Michigan, and New Jersey267 -have held that probationers can validly consent
to conditions that waive their Fourth Amendment rights.
The contract theory of probation depends heavily on the validity of the
privilege theory. The contract theory rests on the notion that the consideration
provided to a probationer who agrees to be bound by a particular condition of
probation is the privilege of being on probation. In People v. Woods, for
example, the Supreme Court of California found that probationers "may validly
consent in advance to warrantless searches in exchange for the opportunity to
avoid service of a state prison term.,268 In United States v. Barnett, the Seventh
Circuit similarly held that probationers can contract to give up their Fourth
Amendment rights for the privilege of avoiding prison:
265. NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N, STANDARD PROBATION & PAROLE ACT 2 (1955).
266. Id.
267. See People v. Woods, 981 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Cal. 1999); Allen v. State, 369 S.E.2d 909, 909 (Ga.
1988); State v. Devore, 2 P.3d 153, 156 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000); People v. Absher, 950 N.E.2d 659, 665
(Ill. 2011); People v. Hellenthal, 465 N.W.2d 329, 330 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Bollinger, 405
A.2d 432, 437 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
268. Woods, 981 P2d at 1023.
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Nothing in the Fourth Amendment's language, background, or purpose would
have justified forcing Barnett to serve a prison sentence rather than to
experience the lesser restraint of probation. Nothing is more common than an
individual's consenting to a search that would otherwise violate the Fourth
Amendment, thinking that he will be better off than he would be standing on
his rights.269
As noted in the previous section, this kind of reasoning assumes that search
conditions are imposed only in cases in which probation is a true reprieve from
prison. Probation is only a privilege, however, in a case in which a sentence of
imprisonment would also be a proportionate and just sentence for that particular
defendant. Although some probation cases clearly fall within this category,
many do not. Thus, in the aggregate, probationers are forced to accept probation
conditions without receiving any proper consideration. Because the system can
always afford to put one more person in prison, however, no individual proba-
tioner has any real leverage to challenge the conditions imposed.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the probationer's lack of bargaining
power over which probation conditions are imposed. In Burns, the 1932 case
that first announced the privilege theory, the Court held that probation was "a
matter of favor, not of contract.,270 Because probation was a privilege, probation-
ers had no right to haggle over the terms that would be imposed on them. They
had to accept the system as it was without attempting to "insist on terms or
strike a bargain.,271 This analysis would seem to vitiate reliance on a contract
theory to justify waivers, but it has not stopped courts from doing so.
Although probationers typically cannot negotiate over the conditions of
probation, courts and probation departments often try to create the appearance
of a contract. They require probationers to sign documents formally agreeing to
accept all of the conditions imposed. The instruction form for adult probationers
in Orange County, California, provides a typical example. This form, prepared
by the Orange County Department of Probation, lays out all of the standard
conditions of probation.27 2 The probationer must initial a box beside each of the
conditions. The probationer then signs the form under the following acknowledg-
ment: "I have personally initialed the above boxes and understand each and
every one outlined above. I hereby acknowledge receipt of and agree to comply
with the above instructions.2 73 The structure of the form, which announces the
predetermined rules of probation, creates the appearance of a contract.
269. 415 E3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2005).
270. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
271. Id.
272. Orange Cnty., Cal., supra note 124.
273. Id.
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To the extent that these forms might be contracts, they are more like cell
phone contracts and other contracts of adhesion than negotiated
contracts.27 4 But unlike a person who decides to purchase a cell phone, the
probationer cannot opt out of the system. That is, a probationer cannot opt out
of the system unless he or she decides to insist on a sentence of incarceration,
even if no one else would be incarcerated under the same circumstances.
In addition, the contract rationale must be analyzed against the backdrop of
the points made earlier in this Article concerning the substantive scope of the
standard conditions of probation, the vagueness of many of their terms, and the
ways they can be enforced. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to argue that
probationers as a class have entered into a bargain or a meeting of the minds
pursuant to which they have meaningfully waived their rights.
V. OVERCRIMINALIZATION, UNEQUAL POLICING, AND THE CONCENTRATION
OF POWER
The legal framework of probation perpetuates everal key problems that
scholars have criticized elsewhere in the criminal justice system: overcriminaliza-
tion, the shifting of power toward the system's law enforcers, and the unequal
policing of the poor. Indeed, as I will argue, the impact of being on probation
takes many of these criticisms to a whole new level, despite the fact that,
ironically, probation is often presented as a solution to problems in other parts
of the system.
The law of probation has been sidelined for three main reasons. First,
probation continues to suffer from its outdated reputation as a progressive
alternative to incarceration. The fact that probation is a community-based
sanction has tilted scholars away from probation and towards a focus on the
more serious condition of incarceration, even though probation and incarcera-
tion are now regularly intertwined: judges routinely mix sentences of probation
and incarceration, and the revocation of probation has been a leading source of
overcrowding in prisons and jails.2 75 Moreover, the hope that probation might
solve the problems of mass incarceration has led policymakers to glide over the
problems created by probation itself.
Second, the conditions of probation are not easy to access. I found it
surprisingly difficult to retrieve even standard conditions, the bedrock law of
probation, across the multiple jurisdictions in this study. One of the major goals
of this Article was to begin to map out the standard conditions because it has not
been done and any examination of the system is impossible unless we know and
understand what the basic contours of probation are.
274. See Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some Proposals for
Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 75, 86 (2000) (noting that the
"extraordinary inequality in bargaining power" has led virtually all scholars to reject the contract theory
of probation).
275. AM. PROB. & PAROLE Ass'N & NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 159, at 1.
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Third, the expectations set by many standard conditions fall differently on
those who are poor and least able to make their experiences visible. In part, this
extends to the availability of legal resources to provide a check on the people
who hold discretionary power over probationers' lives. A person with a private
lawyer, for example, can call on that lawyer to intercede with a probation officer
and create a record (or some atmosphere of accountability) of how power is
being exercised by that officer. In general, however, appointed lawyers do not
stay on cases postsentencing unless and until a violation of probation is reported
to the court.27 6 A poor probationer is for the most part on his or her own,
especially with respect to the extrajudicial sanctions and impositions of control
effectuated by probation officers. Those interactions are more widely occurring
and impact more people than judicial revocation hearings.
Legal research focused on the expanding reach of the criminal law is one
example of an area of scholarship that has largely overlooked the role of
probation. Scholars of overcriminalization have criticized legislatures for pass-
ing too many criminal statutes and for passing criminal statutes that are too
vague and too broad.2 77 They also condemn legislatures for "regularly add[ing]
to criminal codes, but rarely subtract[ing] from them," carving out ever greater
swaths of criminal liability.
278
This study of the standard conditions of probation reveals that these condi-
tions are extreme (but unacknowledged) examples of the overcriminalization
trend. The fact that some jurisdictions make obeying every local ordinance a
condition of probation is just one illustration of how broadly a probation system
can reach. New Jersey, for example, has a standard condition requiring compli-
ance with "all federal, state, and municipal laws and ordinances.,279 Local New
Jersey ordinances, meanwhile, cover requirements as varied as not feeding
pigeons or squirrels280 and not flying a kite in a park.281 Through the standard
conditions of probation, all of these activities attain the force of criminal acts
for probationers, who constitute a not-insignificant percentage of the population.
At the same time, courts continue to impose moralistic conditions that date
from the Progressive Era. In many jurisdictions, the law makes probationers
vulnerable to penal sanction if they fail to be good, for example, or fail to avoid
vicious habits. These conditions may be remnants of a discredited philosophy,
but judges continue to impose them just the same. Tellingly, the jurisdictions in
276. See, e.g., Interview with Pub. Defender, DeKalb Cnty., Ga. (Sept. 30, 2014) (on file with
author) (noting that a public defender is not assigned to a case postsentencing, once the person is on
probation, unless there is an active warrant for a court-based revocation proceeding).
277. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv.
2117, 2136 (1998) ("Most legal academics, however, would probably also agree that there are too many
criminal statutes on the books, and that those statutes are frequently too broad and too vague.").
278. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507
(2001).
279. N.J. Judiciary, supra note 78.
280. See NEWARK, N.J., MUN. CODE § 20:20-1(n) (2015).
281. NEWARK, N.J., MUN. CODE § 20:2-12 (2015).
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my study did not modify their standard conditions in the 1970s, at the height of
the public assault on the Progressive philosophy elsewhere in the criminal
justice system.2 82 They continue to impose these same conditions decades later,
even while embracing an increasingly deterrence-oriented philosophy of supervi-
sion-a philosophy that demands that probation officers respond to every
violation of a condition to maintain respect for their credibility and authority.
Meanwhile, the language and impact of the conditions, looser than even the
loosest criminal statutes, continue to escape attention and analysis.
Noted legal scholars have described how broad criminal statutes transfer
lawmaking authority to police and to prosecutors.2 83 William J. Stuntz ex-
plained, for example, that because the "criminal law is broad, prosecutors
cannot possibly enforce the law as written: there are too many violators.2 84
Because the language of the law captures too much conduct to determine who
goes to prison, it necessarily empowers law enforcers to take over that function:
the police by deciding whom to arrest and the prosecutors by deciding whom to
prosecute. The system's law enforcers, in Stuntz's analysis, become the sys-
tem's "real lawmakers.28 5
This dynamic is even more intense with respect to probation. The language of
probation conditions propels the probation officer into lawmaker status. And the
fact that standard conditions of probation are simultaneously so deep (obey all
laws) and so broad (be good) transfers that much more lawmaking power to
these officers. Even more than the prosecutor, the probation officer is a hidden
and unaccountable lawmaker.
Some jurisdictions make the probation officer's legislative function explicit.
In Texas, for example, the standard conditions typically include a catchall
requirement that the probationer abide by "the rules and regulations" of the
supervision department.2 86 One of the standard conditions in Delaware County,
Pennsylvania, is that the probationer "abide by any written instructions" of the
probation officer.28 7 A standard condition in the state of Delaware requires that
probationers comply with any "[s]pecial condition" imposed by the probation
officer.28 8 Each such condition transforms the probation officer into an unequivo-
cal lawmaker with authority over probationers' lives.
A related body of legal scholarship has focused on the increasingly adjudica-
tive (or judge-like) role of law enforcement officers. In studying federal plea
282. Doherty, supra note 7, at 991-95 (discussing the building criticism of indeterminate sentencing
and coercive rehabilitation in the late 1960s and 1970s).
283. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 278, at 509 ("As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and
adjudication pass into the hands of police and prosecutors ... .
284. Id. at519.
285. Id. at 506.
286. Dallas Cnty., Tex., Community Supervision, supra note 28; Harris Cnty., Tex., supra note 28;
Tarrant Cnty., Texas, Community Supervision, supra note 28.
287. Adult Prob. & Parole Servs., Delaware Cnty., Pa., General Rules, Regulations and Conditions
Governing Adult Probation/Parole.
288. Del. Dep't of Corr., supra note 74, at 1.
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bargaining, for example, Rachel E. Barkow has stressed that federal prosecutors
are both the investigators and adjudicators in the ninety-five percent of federal
cases that result in guilty pleas.2 9 Barkow criticizes this consolidation of roles,
arguing that "[pirosecutors who investigate a case are poorly positioned to make
a final assessment of guilt because they cannot view the facts impartially. After
investing time and effort in pursuing a particular defendant, the prosecutor
cannot view the facts as a neutral party.,290 Barkow argues that this merging of
enforcement and adjudicative powers creates enhanced opportunities for a
single prosecutor's "prejudices and biases to dictate outcomes.29 1
This critique applies squarely to probation officers. Indeed, for violations of
probation that do not lead to court-based revocation proceedings, probation
officers arguably inhabit the roles of victim, witness, investigator, prosecutor,
and judge, all in the same case. The probation officer is the de facto victim (the
complainant) if a probationer fails to adhere to many of the standard conditions
of probation-failing to report as required, for example, or refusing to submit to
a search. The probation officer then becomes the investigator of the alleged
violation, deciding whom to interview and how to document his or her own
observations (as the primary witness to the violation). Next, the probation
officer assumes the role of prosecutor, deciding what violations to charge. If the
violations do not lead to a formal revocation petition, the probation officer will
also decide whether the probationer is guilty of the violations and what the
administrative sanction should be. And unlike plea bargaining outcomes, which
are recorded in open court, administrative sanctions need not appear on the
public record.
The multiple roles of the probation officer when alleged violations do lead to
court-based revocation proceedings also deserve careful study. The probation
officer typically serves as the instigator of the revocation proceedings and as a
principal witness at the hearing. At the same time, the probation officer is
considered an officer of the court, conferring a type of insider status within the
court system.
The federal system provides an example of just how complicated (and
structurally compromised) the probation officer's role can become during for-
mal revocation proceedings. Federal probation officers are employees of the
court system.292 In many federal districts, this status has led to probation
officers having off-the-record conversations with judges about cases, even
though the probation officer is the accuser and witness against the proba-
289. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Adminis-
trative Law, 61 STAN. L. REv. 869, 869 (2009).
290. Id. at 883.
291. Id.
292. Probation and Pretrial Officers and Officer Assistants, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-and-pretrial-officers-and-officer (last visited Sept.
15, 2015) ("U.S. probation.., officers... are federal law enforcement officers and U.S. district court
employees.").
2016]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
tioner.2 93 The U.S. Attorney's Office, moreover, often represents the probation
officer in revocation proceedings in an attorney-client form of relationship.
294
Thus, the probation officer has a privileged relationship with both branches of
government at the hearing: the prosecutor, who decides how vigorously to
prosecute the alleged violation in court, and the judge, who decides if the
probationer is guilty and what the sentence should be.
These role dynamics are particularly important, because the violation need
only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Although this standard is
the general civil standard, it does not work in the same way for a probation
revocation hearing as it does for an ordinary civil case. Unlike the typical
defendant in a civil case, the probationer has already been convicted of a crime.
This conviction means that the probationer's status and credibility have already
been diminished in the eyes of the court. Meanwhile, the plaintiff in the hearing
is the probation officer. The relative standing of these two participants becomes
highly significant when the violation must be proven only by a preponderance
of the evidence.
This combination of status and the probationer's reduced due process rights
means that a probationer often has little leverage at revocation. The conditions
of probation are broad. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment can be used against the probationer at the hearing.295 Violations need only
be established by a preponderance of the evidence. The probationer is already
marked as a criminal. The chief witness against the probationer is an officer (or
perhaps employee) of the court. Given this combination of factors, few proba-
tion violations are contested in a hearing.
Whether the weight of this system falls equally on the rich and the poor (and
other disadvantaged social groups) is a question that must be considered in any
examination of the law of probation. After all, it was an explicitly class-based
project that first inspired many of the conditions identified in this study.
Progressive reformers ought to help nudge poor Americans into the ranks of
the middle class by encouraging hard work, sobriety, and stable employment.29 6
The expectations set by the conditions, aided by the supposedly friendly interven-
293. See, e.g., United States v. Maury, 530 F. App'x 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that district
court's ex parte conference with probation officer in revocation proceeding did not affect defendant's
substantial rights); United States v. Pittarelli, 205 F. App'x 188, 189 (4th Cir. 2006) (denying challenge
to claimed ex parte meeting between judge and probation officer prior to revocation hearing); United
States v. Davis, 151 F.3d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Because of the 'close working relationship
between the probation officer and the sentencing court,' the probation officer may communicate ex
parte with the district court .... ").
294. This arrangement is standard practice, for example, in the Eastern District of New York and the
District of Connecticut. See E-mail from Assistant Fed. Defender, Fed. Pub. Defender, D. Conn., to
author (Sept. 29, 2015, 3:47 PM) (on file with author); E-mail from Assistant Fed. Defender, Fed. Pub.
Defender, E.D.N.Y., to author (Sept. 29, 2015, 3:35 PM) (on file with author). It is also standard
practice in the Southern District of New York, where I served as an Assistant Federal Defender between
2005 and 2010.
295. See supra section III.A.2
296. WILLARD GAYLIN ET AL., DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE 75 (1978).
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tions of a probation officer, were meant to elevate the poor-not to make them
more vulnerable.
The critique of Progressive-inspired rehabilitation programs, however, was
that they did make poor people vulnerable by granting the state huge amounts of
discretionary power over their lives.297 The Progressives justified these broad
discretionary powers because of the humanitarian quality of their interventions.
But critics showed how the language of benevolence was being used to mask
the realities of penal control.298 An influential 1971 report by the American
Friends Service Committee charged that the discretion exercised in the name of
rehabilitation was really a method of keeping the "powerless in line. 2 99
This history suggests that he class-based dimensions of modern probation
systems deserve careful study. How should standard conditions be understood
today outside the framework of benevolent optimism that was used to justify
their early imposition? How do these conditions operate in the control-oriented
and discipline-focused mindset of modern probation systems?
As discussed in Part II, a common condition of probation is that the proba-
tioner be productively occupied (in work or at school) and financially respon-
sible (supporting dependents and paying all relevant fees and fines). The
employment conditions in my study fall along a spectrum, ranging from the
least directive (requiring probationers to work faithfully at suitable employment
in so far as possible) to the most directive (requiring probationers to be
employed full-time). 30 0 The support your dependents conditions follow a simi-
lar pattern.
These kinds of employment and support conditions function differently
depending on a probationer's social class. Poor people are arguably less likely
to find stable employment than those who have more resources.30 1 And people
are poor because of long-standing factors like educational background, family
circumstances, and lack of stable work history. Being on probation only makes
297. ROTHMAN, supra note 163, at 61.
298. See, e.g., FRANCIS ALLEN, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33-34 (1964) (emphasizing how "the vocabulary of therapy" had been "exploited").
299. See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 28 (1971).
300. See supra Table 5.
301. See Susan Lambert & Julia Henly, Double Jeopardy: The Misfit Between Welfare-to-Work
Requirements and Job Realities, in WORK AND THE WELFARE STATE: STREET-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS AND
WORKFARE POLITICS 69, 81 (Evelyn Z. Brodkin & Gregory Marston eds., 2013) ("[T]he changing nature
of employment at the low end of the labor market suggests that.., available jobs are increasingly 'bad
jobs,' subject to the cost-containment practices ... that expose low-income individuals to significant
market risk." (citation omitted)); Franqoise Carr et al., Retail Jobs in Comparative Perspective, in
Low-WAGE WORK IN THE WEALTHY WORLD 211, 212 (Jer6me Gautie & John Schmitt eds., 2010) (finding
a 50% annual labor turnover rate in U.S. retail jobs in 2002, with 42% of retail workers receiving wages
in the bottom two-thirds of national wage rates). See generally Guy STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW
DANGEROUS CLASS (2011) (describing an emerging class defined by its inability to escape from
insecurity in working conditions).
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matters worse-due in part to employer skepticism of people with criminal
histories.
Requiring poor and disadvantaged people to work as a condition of their
probation leaves them exposed. Even the least directive example in my study
lets the probation officer determine what efforts a person should take to find a
job and what efforts are insufficient. The most directive conditions leave
probationers vulnerable to sanction if they cannot secure an explicitly full-time
job, whatever the status of the employment market.
Many of the policing conditions also acquire a more menacing resonance,
depending on a probationer's resources. The requirement to report as directed,
for example, can be disproportionately difficult for poor people, as can the
requirement to attend fixed treatment appointments. People with low paying
jobs are less likely to have flexibility in their work schedules. Missing work
makes them at risk of losing their jobs. They lose money if they lose work
hours. If they have children, they may struggle to pay for a babysitter. For the
poorest probationers, of whom there are many, finding reliable and affordable
transportation to the probation office or to a treatment program can be an
insurmountable hurdle.
Focused on enforcement, the rules and regulations of probation departments
often seem blind to these problems. The Travis County Probation Department in
Texas, for example, includes the following notice on its website under the
banner "frequently asked questions" concerning "conditions of probation:"
Can I bring children to my office visits?
No, children cannot come with you to an office visit. Some office visits may
take up to 2 hours to complete, depending on the purpose of the visit. You
need to try and find someone to watch your children prior to your office
Vit302visit.
3°
The intersection of the policing conditions with the payment conditions also
raises questions about the extent to which such fees serve as tripwires for the
poor. Although the Supreme Court has held that probationers cannot be jailed
solely for not being able to pay their fees,30 3 the threat of rearrest is a common
tactic in pressuring probationers to pay.30 4 In Georgia, for example, private
probation companies have been criticized for aggressively threatening probation-
ers with jail if they fall behind in their payments.30 5 But the risk of jail, or at
least some administrative sanction, is implicit in the very fact that paying the
fees is a condition of probation.
302. FAQ Probation Conditions, TRAVis CNTY., TEX., https://www.traviscountytx.gov/adult-probation/
faq-condtions (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
303. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983).
304. See supra Part I.D.
305. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 92, at 49-53.
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The fees for the Probation Reporting Center (PRC) in Ramsey County,
Minnesota, provide an illustration of how these payment requirements are
presented to probationers. The PRC is a form of (nonprivate) call-in supervision
specifically intended for low- and moderate-risk probationers. Participation is
mandatory for any probationers assigned to PRC, but it comes with a supplemen-
tal $7-per-month program fee, which must be paid through a money order.30 6 In
presenting this monthly payment, Ramsey County Community Corrections
(RCCC) notes that the call-in system saves a probationer time and money
considering "the cost of driving, parking, time off of work or school and other
expenses associated with the trip to see your probation officer., 30 7 But the
probation department also emphasizes the consequences of any refusal to pay
the seven-dollar fee:
If you refuse to pay, then you are not complying with the terms of your
probation. RCCC has determined this is how you will report, so you must
comply with paying the costs associated with the program. If you do not
comply, you will be in violation of the terms and conditions of your probation,
as you will be locked out of the system. If you fail to make your call, a
probation violation maybe submitted.308
Failing to pay such fees-or violating any other condition of probation-also
has implications for a probationer's eligibility for federal assistance programs.
A probationer is not eligible to receive assistance under a host of federal
programs if he or she is violating "a condition of probation or parole imposed
under Federal or State law.",30 9 Such programs include: Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP,
formerly Food Stamps), federal housing assistance programs (including public
housing and Section 8), Social Security disability, and Old-Age, Survivor, and
Disability Insurance (OASDI).310 That probationers must proactively disclose
whether they are violating a condition (however broad that condition might be)
also means that they could be prosecuted for fraud if they do not provide fully
accurate information.
One predictable (but insufficient) response is that probation officers do not
have the resources to enforce most conditions anyway, lessening any disparate
306. Payment for PRC, RAMSEY CNTY., https://www.co.ramsey.mn.us/cc/payment for prc.htm (last
visited Sept. 15, 2015).
307. Frequently Asked PRC Questions, RAMSEY CNTY., https://www.co.ramsey.mn.us/cc/frequently
asked prc questions.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2012) (prohibition in TANF statute mandating "denial
of assistance" to "probation and parole violators").
310. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8)(E) (2012) (SNAP bar for anyone "violating a condition of probation or
parole imposed under Federal or State law"); 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2012); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(e)(4)(A)(ii) (2012) (same bar for SSI disability); 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(9) (2012) (same bar for
public housing); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(v) (2012) (same bar for project-based Section 8 and
Section 8 vouchers); Pub. L. No. 108-203 §203, 118 Stat. 493 §203 (same bar for OASDI program).
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impact on the poor. But a probationer cannot count on having a probation
officer who takes a relaxed approach to enforcement in his or her case.3 11 And
poor probationers are the least likely to have the social capital to push back if
they are targeted disproportionately, a dynamic that potentially makes them
even more vulnerable to this kind of enforcement. In addition, even if lax
enforcement is common (at least for low-risk probationers), this reality cannot
justify the use of conditions that invite problematic and disparate administra-
tion. As I have explored elsewhere, complaints about the malicious or bad-
tempered enforcement of supervision conditions stretch back into the nineteenth
century.
312
The current emphasis on using risk assessments to decide how closely to
supervise various probationers, a methodology that is part of a growing trend
called evidence-based sentencing, only increases the likelihood of the enhanced
monitoring of the poor. A central idea behind this methodology, as it is applied
to probation, is that probation departments should focus their supervision
resources on probationers who have the highest risk of recidivism (that is,
violating the conditions of their probation).3 13 Although framed in the neutral
language of evidence-based practices, risk assessment instruments rely on a
variety of poverty-correlated variables in sorting individual probationers into
the high-risk categories.
A number of scholars have begun to look at how risk assessment instruments
are weighted against the poor.3 14 A leading instrument called the Correctional
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) provides
a typical example. The COMPAS Probation Assessment Instrument gauges risk
through factors that include a person's income level, employment history, job
skills, stability of residence, whether they own or rent a home, the employment
status of peers and associates, the availability of family resources, and the
criminal history of family members, peers, and associates.315 Under these
measures, probationers are judged to have a higher risk of recidivism the fewer
resources they have.
311. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 163, at 112 ("That the [probation] system's potential for
coercion was never fully realized does not mean that all probationers escaped from the arbitrary
exercise of power."); Klingele, supra note 135, at 1039 ("Agent responses to low-level violations vary
tremendously, even within the same office.").
312. Doherty, supra note 7, at 969.
313. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUST., PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE FUNDING 13 (2012) (noting that evidence-
based principles include providing "more intensive supervision" to "offenders identified as having a
higher risk of reoffending").
314. See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REv. 1329, app. (2011) (documenting use of variables in risk assessments
such as education, employment, finances, family/marital accommodation, and failure to provide support
for biological child.).
315. SHARON LANSING, Div. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., NEW YORK STATE COMPAS-PROBATION RISK AND
NEED ASSESSMENT STUDY: EXAMINING THE RECIDIVISM SCALE'S EFFECTIVENESS AND PREDICTIVE ACCURACY
app. A, 29 (2012) (instrument used for COMPAS probation assessment).
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Sonja Starr has criticized the use of these actuarial risk assessment instru-
ments in criminal sentencing proceedings on both constitutional and empirical
grounds.316 Starr has focused on how judges are using these instruments at
sentencing to determine "whether and for how long a defendant is incarcer-
ated.,317 She argues that the use of these instruments at sentencing violates the
Equal Protection Clause, amounting to "overt discrimination based on demo-
graphics and socioeconomic status.318 In particular, she criticizes the instru-
ments' heavy reliance on factors relating to poverty.
319
Starr also argues that the use of these instruments in individual cases is
empirically flawed. She emphasizes that the instruments cannot provide "any-
thing even approaching a precise prediction of an individual's recidivism risk."
' 320
Instead, the instruments predict only average recidivism rates for all offenders
who share characteristics with a defendant that are included as factors in the
model.321 Thus, judges are using the instruments to make sentencing decisions
for individual defendants, when there can be little confidence in the accuracy of
the risk-based predictions for the individuals in question.
Starr does not focus on probation systems, but he concerns she raises also
apply to how risk assessment instruments are used for probation. As a prelimi-
nary matter, a judge might use a risk assessment at sentencing to decide not
only whether a defendant deserves to be incarcerated but also whether a
defendant should be put on probation (and for how long). In other words, risk
assessment results factor into decisions about whether probation is the appropri-
ate sentence for a particular defendant, as opposed to a more lenient sentence
like an unconditional discharge. In addition, the probation department then uses
risk assessment results o decide how closely to supervise those on probation,
thus using these metrics to decide how punitive the experience of being on
probation will be. These dynamics suggest the cumulative possibilities: the poor
can be disproportionately punished both by being placed under supervision at
higher rates (as they present a higher risk of recidivism) and by being monitored
more strictly once they are under supervision (for the same reason).
The employment conditions provide an example of how these circumstances
could play out in an individual case.322 A person with no family resources,
unstable housing, low job skills, and no obvious employment prospects is
placed on probation. The risk assessment instruments u ed by probation place
the person in a high-risk category. The person is then closely supervised for
compliance with conditions that include finding a stable job, paying monthly
316. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination,




320. Id. at 842.
321. ld. at 842, 847.
322. See supra Table 5.
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supervision fees, and promptly reporting all changes in address. In such a
scenario, being on probation is a sentence that may serve disproportionately to
debilitate-rather than rehabilitate-the poor.
In a similar vein, the racial dynamics of probation enforcement must be
investigated more deeply, particularly as race intersects with class.32 3 How does
race-including unconscious racism-affect how probation officers prioritize
their enforcement resources? To what degree do the heavy policing and underper-
forming public schools of poor urban neighborhoods help sift minorities into
high-risk categories? The little available research does suggest a significant
correlation: being African American is the strongest predictor of a preference
for prison over probation.3 24
CONCLUSION
Probation is, by far, the most commonly imposed criminal sentence in the
United States, with nearly four million adults under supervision. And yet, the
critical analysis that has been applied to incarceration has, for the most part,
avoided the subject of probation entirely.
In this Article, I examine the standard conditions of probation in the sixteen
U.S. jurisdictions that use probation most expansively. Analyzing the details of
these conditions is important because the extent of the state's authority to
control and punish probationers depends on the substance of the conditions
imposed.
Based on the results of my analysis, I argue that the standard conditions of
probation have constructed a sprawling and undertheorized definition of
recidivism-one that leads to overcriminalization, the concentration of adjudica-
tive and legislative power in the probation officer, and the unequal treatment of
the socially disadvantaged. I also conclude that, although probation is often
invoked as a solution to the problem of overincarceration, it should instead be
analyzed as part of the continuum of excessive penal control. The phenomenon
of hypersupervision outside of prisons deserves to be scrutinized in a manner
commensurate with its dominant role in the U.S. criminal justice system.
323. For an important analysis of the racial impact of risk assessments, see Bernard E. Harcourt,
Risk as a Proxyfor Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 237 (2015).
324. Ben M. Crouch, Is Incarceration Really Worse? Analysis of Offenders' Preferences for Prison
Over Probation, 10 JusT. Q. 67, 85 (1993).
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